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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade now, scholars from several academic disciplines
have been preoccupied with examining the role of informal social norms-as
contrasted with formal law-in coordinating social behavior, determining
individual entitlements, and guiding dispute resolution efforts. It has been
found that extralegal norms determine individual entitlements in cattle-
trespass disputes between neighbors in rural California ranching
communities,1 govern contractual relationships in the New York diamond
industry,2 structure individual obligations under collective pollination
regimes among Washington orchard owners,3 settle disputes over karaoke
noise pollution,4 and guide the operations of Japan's National Sumo
Association. 5 Other studies have suggested that extralegal norms are also
instrumental to groundwater distribution regimes, 6 the exercise of voting
rights, 7 conflict management between neighbors in urban America, 8 the
prevalence of smoking and certain sexual behaviors, 9 and other macro-level
socio-political phenomena. Most of these studies have confirmed the
relevance-indeed the primacy-of informal social norms in determining
See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WiTHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (using cattlemen in Shasta County, California, to illustrate that
members of a close-knit group can develop informal norms that are utilitarian).
2 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 130-43 (1992).
3 Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. &
EcoN. 11, 30 (1973).
4 Mark D. West, The Resolution of Karaoke Disputes: The Calculus of Institutions
and Social Capital, 28 J. JAPANESE STuD. 301, 303-06 (2002).
5 Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 165,200-01 (1997).
6 ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON POOL RESOURCES 283-300
(1994).
7 Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2151-64
(1996).
8 Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an
American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 891, 899-908 (1979).
9 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 930-47
(1996).
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individual entitlements and resolving disputes. Yet all of these prior pieces of
scholarship have focused on disputes in societies characterized by a
developed economy, a more or less robust, independent set of legal
institutions, and a liberal democratic political system.
This study aims at adding a needed perspective to the existing literature
by examining dispute resolution practices in a far different environment: the
traditional neighborhoods' ° of urban China. Unlike the environments
examined in prior studies, Hutong neighborhoods are economically
underdeveloped and subject to an institutionally deficient legal system, a
non-democratic political regime, and a distinctly illiberal post-war cultural
experience. The extent which dispute resolution practices in ancient Beijing
Hutong neighborhoods track those prevalent in the modem Western world
has great implications for the law and society literature of the last decade.
Are the norm-based systems documented over the last ten years a truly
universal human phenomenon, or are they a more distinct product of
practices and intuitions unique to developed liberal market societies? Are
there unique practices or institutional arrangements in radically dissimilar
cultural settings that can help enrich-and place in proper perspective--our
understanding of more familiar dispute resolution mechanisms? Are there
valuable lessons that we in Western academia can learn?
In fact, our research did reveal that residents of Beijing Hutongs rely
primarily on informal social norms in determining individual entitlements
and resolving disputes among themselves. Private bargaining between
individuals according to community social norms is the default option for
residents who have grievances against their neighbors. Recourse to formal
legal channels is viewed as too costly, socially disruptive, and unpredictable
to be an efficient option in all but the most serious disputes. In these respects,
our findings corroborate the general thrust of recent law and society
scholarship on dispute resolution in more developed countries. The main
point of divergence in general orientation is the Hutong residents' view of
formal legal institutions as fundamentally unpredictable and untrustworthy,
as opposed to simply too expensive. This finding derives directly from the
underdeveloped nature of the Chinese legal system and thus may be common
to dispute resolution regimes across the developing world.
Yet, even within this familiar norm-based orientation, novelties emerge
as Hutong communities use some unique institutional arrangements to
manage norm-based dispute resolution. When disputes between neighbors
prove intractable, Hutong residents engage in a set of unique, middle
10 See infra discussion Parts II.A, II.B (providing a full description of Hutongs as
residential environments).
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institutions we term "non-legalistic public authorities." Comprised of the
local Residents' Committees and specialized Neighborhood Police, these
institutions lie somewhere between the domains of formal law and informal
social norms. They are institutions expressly tied to the community that act
as neutral mediators for Hutong residents. They are commissioned by the
Beijing municipal government and they receive salaries from public funds,
but they do not apply formal legal rules in mediating disputes and they have
no coercive or punitive powers. Instead, they act as specialized custodians of
community social norms, resolving disputes as those norms dictate, and
relying on the community's collective informal sanctioning of intransigents
to enforce their mediated solutions.
Through these institutions, Hutong residents benefit from the cost,
flexibility, and convenience advantages of norm-based solutions while also
securing some of the benefits of institutional specialization and
standardization. While simultaneously providing some standardization,
consistency, and predictability in the mediation process, these non-legalistic
public authorities can articulate and refine community norms according to
best practices and the changing social needs of the community. Such
"expert" third parties also alleviate the difficulties of bilateral bargaining and
reduce the likelihood of socially destructive norm-application by individual
residents. They also bring standardization, consistency, and predictability to
the mediation process. Thus, our results suggest that, while social norms are
certainly the informal creation of the community, formal institutions can
actually play a vital role in upholding and administering a norm-based social
regime, often achieving results preferable to purely informal, decentralized
modalities.
The solutions mediated by these non-legalistic public authorities are in
turn enforced informally by the community through direct physical reprisals
or group social punishments against norm-violators. In this process,
residents' reputation and status within the community is a vital consideration,
and many of the residents appear to be maximizing social status as much as
economic efficiency in upholding norm-based dispute resolutions. This result
implies that, at least for pre-market communities, social status may be just as
important as material wealth in individual dispute resolution calculations.
At the very least, this study hopes to add an important missing data point
to the accumulated law and society literature on dispute resolution
mechanisms and the complex relationship between law and general social
practice. Dispute resolution practices in developing countries and (post-
communist states in particular) deserve to be understood and incorporated
into the literature. At its most ambitious, this project seeks to inject some
fresh insight into the received wisdom of the field, uncover novel
[Vol. 20:3 20051
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institutional arrangements, raise new questions, and add some important new
elements to the overall picture painted by the scholarship of the last decade.
It also may provide some valuable lessons for other communities facing the
difficult transition from more traditional ways of life to technological
modernity.
This Article is comprised of seven main Parts. The first Part will discuss
the Hutong neighborhoods themselves, both as historical residential
institutions and as modem living environments in Beijing today. The second
Part will briefly describe our research methods. The third Part will review the
basic, three-tiered dispute resolution regime available to Hutong residents,
with special emphasis on two unique institutions-termed "non-legalistic
public authorities"-that specialize in mediating disputes between neighbors:
the Residents' Committees ('juwei hui") and the Neighborhood Police
branches ("pianerjing"). The fourth and fifth Parts will discuss our research
findings in some depth, including which dispute resolution mechanisms
Hutong residents prefer for different recurring dispute types and why
residents prefer certain norm-based dispute resolution mechanisms (and
associated informal institutional arrangements) over more formalized law-
based options. The sixth Part will address the enforcement of norm-based
dispute resolutions in Hutong neighborhoods, touching upon the role of
private reprisals, public shame, and internalized values in making norm-
based dispute resolutions stick. The final Part will conclude with a brief
assessment of the future of the Hutong dispute resolution regime amid the
deep social and economic changes underway in present-day urban China.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE HUTONG RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENT
A. From "Siheyuan" to "Dazayuan ": A Brief History of Beijing
Hutongs
Beijing's numerous Hutongs have served as long-standing residential
institutions for generations. The word "Hutong" refers to the lanes or
alleyways that connect the traditional living quarters of Beijing residents,
known as "siheyuan," or quadrangles. While linguists still argue about the
exact meaning of the term "Hutong," many believe that it originated from the
Mongolian word for "huddug" which means "a well to draw water from."'
1I
11 ZHANG QINGCHANG, BEIJING JIEXIANG MINGCHENG SHHIUA: SHEHUI
YUYANXUEDE ZAITANS14UO [HISTORY OF THE NAMES OF BEING's LANES AND ALLEYS:
SOCIO-LINGUISTIC RE-EXPLORATION] 462 (1997). There are scholarly debates about the
original meaning and evolution of the term "Hutong." See id. at 460-68. One explanation
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This Mongolian term was adopted to describe these lanes and alleys because
Beijing was largely expanded as a capital city by the Mongolian Yuan
dynasty in China (1276-1368 A.D.). 12 Beijing has served as the capital of the
country since then, 13 and, despite changes in governments, the basic structure
of the city was kept largely intact until the early 1980s, when the city began
undergoing large-scale construction and modernization efforts. 14
The complex urban honeycomb of Hutongs and quadrangles that grew
out of the Yuan dynasty has remained an important residential environment
in Beijing for centuries. Most of the Hutong neighborhoods that remain today
were built in the Ming and Qing dynasties, though some can still be
identified as from the earlier Yuan dynasty. 15 Typically, Hutongs connect
vast networks of "siheyuan" (or quadrangle) residences. The term "siheyuan"
refers to the traditional-style Beijing courtyard house, each consisting of a
rectangle courtyard surrounded by single-story tile-roofed houses on all four
sides. The Hutongs themselves serve as passageways between rows of these
for the term "Hutong" is that the word originated from a Chinese word which means "fire
lanes." The evidence for this explanation is that there was a specific rule as to the width
of these alleys so they could serve as fire lanes during the Yuan dynasty. WONG LI,
BEUIINGDE HUTONG [BEIJING's HUTONG] 4 (1992). As the population of the capital grew
with time, however, this rule could no longer be followed by mid-Yuan. Id.
12 In the year of 1271, Kubla Khan led his Mongolian army to conquer China and
established the Yuan dynasty with its capital in Beijing, which literally means the
Northern Capital. Id. at 152-75. Although this was not the first time that the city served
as a capital, Beijing was redesigned and greatly expanded during this period of time with
many Mongolians settling there. Id. Today, only a few sites in the city of Beijing can be
traced back to the Yuan dynasty. Id. The Yuan design laid the foundation for the capital.
Id. It is believed that the people who lived there built their houses around the wells and
Hutongs were those narrow lanes leading to the wells. Id. When the next dynasty, the
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.), moved its capital to Beijing in 1403, it followed the
Yuan design ahd kept the Hutong structure of the ordinary residences. See id.
13 The Ming first established their capital in Nanjing in 1368 and moved to Beijing
in 1403. DANGDAI BEIJING JIANSHI [MODERN HISTORY OF BEIJING] 2-12 (Zhou Yixing
ed., 1995). The next and the last dynasty, Qing (1644-1911 A.D.) also had its capital
there. Id. With the exception of the Nationalist government, which moved its capital to
Nanjing between 1929 and 1949, Beijing has been the capital city for the last eight
centuries. Id.
14 See Pushpa Adhikari, Traditional Homes Bulldozed By Modernity, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, March 16, 1999, at http://www.atimes.com/china/AC16Ad01.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2005); Will Beijing's Hutongs Vanish?, TRAVEL CHINA WEEKLY NEWSPAPER,
available at http://www.chinavista.com/travel/Hutong/enHutong.html.
15 One such example is the Zhuanta Hutong on the west side of the city. This
Hutong was mentioned in Yuan dramas and was also the birthplace of a famous Yuan
playwright. See WONG, supra note 11, at 9.
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siheyuan households. The majority of Hutongs run straight from east to west,
though some also run from north to south. This arrangement is due to the
traditional Chinese architectural convention of having residential houses
facing south in order to take in more sunshine and resist cold wind from the
north. 16 Though initially built in orderly, grid-like configurations, centuries
of construction efforts have made today's Hutong neighborhoods a
labyrinthine web of winding alleyways and densely-packed residential
structures. 17 While historical records show that in the Yuan dynasty all
Hutongs were required to be nine-meters wide, today's Hutongs vary widely
in length, width, shape, and spatial orientation, ranging from ten meters to
forty centimeters in width, and 8,000 meters to ten meters in length, with
some Hutongs winding through more than twenty turns.18 Today, the word
"Hutong" commonly refers only to residential areas, while the term "street"
is generally reserved for commercial or industrial areas.
Statistics show there were about 413 Hutongs in Yuan dynasty Beijing,
about 1170 in the Ming dynasty, and roughly 3200 by the year of 1944.19 By
the mid-20th century, Hutongs had become not only a trademark of the
capital city, but also the way people outside the capital referred to Beijing's
residential quarters and its residents' traditional way of life. The three words
old Beijing residents use most often to describe traditional Hutong living are
stability, interconnection, and harmony among neighbors. 20 In the past, the
most privileged Beijing residents could afford to have their own self-
contained living quarters, while the majority of common Beijingers
16 There is also a traditional feng-shui principle to such an arrangement. Therefore,
the family members in a single siheyuan courtyard house would always occupy the row
of houses facing south as their main living quarters while using the houses on the other
three sides to serve as study, kitchen, storage, or guest rooms.
17 WONG, supra note 11, at 13.
18Id.
19 These numbers are estimates rather than accurate statistics. The author of
Beijing's Hutongs has bemoaned the fact that it is almost impossible to get an accurate
count of these Hutongs because many are overlapping and confusing as they extend over
time. See id. at 11. The number of Hutongs hugely increased in the Qing dynasty. Id.
20 Many scholars have written on this so-called subject of Hutong culture. See Xu
CHENGBEI, LAoBEIJING: XIANGMO MINFENG [THE OLD BEIJING: THE HUTONG RESIDENTS'
CUSTOMS AND CULTURE] 33-42 (1999); YANG DONGPING, CHENGSHI JIFENG [CULTURE
AND SPIRIT OF BEIJING AND SHENGHAI] 176-82 (1994). The Hutong residents we
interviewed also used these three words over and over again to describe their daily life to
US.
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inevitably had numerous contacts with their neighbors.21 The sheer spatial
proximity of neighboring siheyuan courtyards along common Hutong
alleyways, combined with the frequent need for neighborly help and
cooperation in daily life, made harmonious relationships among residents
crucial. Traditional governance structures also drew people together through
administrative measures by forming neighborhood associations, with each
household taking turns to guard the neighborhood. 22 In such closely
connected neighborhoods of courtyards and Hutongs, local residents tended
to stay in the same place for generations, forging deep social bonds with their
neighbors and formulating a unique set of local norms and customs to order
their relationships and social activities. Sharing common Hutong space and
close social ties helped Hutong residents appreciate the importance of having
a stable community upon which they could rely, especially during
historically chaotic eras. 23 A common saying captures the essence of this
perception: "A neighbor close by is much better than a relative afar."'24
The need to have a stable and harmonious neighborhood became even
more crucial after the Communist revolution of 1949. In response to the
Revolution, more and more people began to share courtyards that formerly
housed only single families. 25 The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912 saw
a large-scale change of ownership in many siheyuan houses, as the former
Manchu banner families had to move out.26 Later, when the Communist
21 While a typical siheyuan consists of a single courtyard, with houses on all four
sides, it is occupied by one single family. See generally WONG, supra note 11. The more
affluent families often had several such courtyards linked together to form a compound.
Id. As of today, the biggest existing siheyuan compound in Beijing has six courtyards
with hundreds of rooms and two gardens. Id. Such luxurious residential compounds
belonged to the Qing princes and high-ranking ministers and later to the high-ranking
Communist leaders. Id. These compounds have built-in wells and other facilities, which
enabled the occupants to live a relatively isolated life compared to the other residents. Id.
22 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District (July 26, 2002)
(notes on file with authors).
23 Since the Yaun dynasty, especially in the last century, Beijing, like many other
places in China, had to undergo one chaotic upheaval after another as different political
and military forces came and went.
24 This is actually the most-often used expression by the Hutong residents when
asked during our interviews how they viewed their relationships with their neighbors and
why they believed that the disputes among them were best solved through negotiation
and mediation rather than the more formal legal means. See, e.g., Interview with
Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
25 Id.
26 The last Manchu emperor of the Qing dynasty abdicated in 1912. LIANG SHIQIU,
LIANG SHIQIU WENJI [THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LIANG SHIQIu] 87 (2004). The Manchu
[Vol. 20:3 20051
BEIJING HUTONGS
Party gained control of China in 1949, Beijing again experienced tremendous
changes in its residential quarters. Formerly private housing space was
redistributed to the broader masses, such that almost all the previously
single-family courtyard houses came to be occupied by multiple families-
except those courtyards reserved for high-ranking Communist Party
officials. 27 The communist government gradually took over more and more
privately-owned households and redistributed them to the homeless urban
poor and those who had followed the new government to Beijing.28 Through
political campaigns like the anti-rightists movements in 1957 and the Great
Leap Forward in 1958, the communist regime managed to get rid of many
perceived political enemies by sending them to remote rural areas. Into their
former residences flooded many poor families who used to live in the
outlying villages and now came back to work in the new manufacturing
sector of the city.
Gradually, the traditional siheyuan courtyard was replaced by what
Beijingers call "dazayuan," or "big chaotic (multi-family) courtyards." What
distinguishes a traditional siheyuan from a dazayuan is not only that more
families occupy the latter, but also that more buildings, like sheds used as
kitchens, storage rooms, or even bedrooms, were constructed by these
families in common courtyard areas. Residents in these multi-family
courtyard residences were increasingly forced to expand their living quarters
into traditional courtyard areas and compete with each other for common
banners who used to occupy the best houses in the inner city had gradually adopted a
quite decadent lifestyle as they were guaranteed annual income from the government
without any need to work. Id. This had caused serious anti-Manchu sentiment among the
Han people in the 19th century. Id. With their subsidies gone now that their government
had been replaced by a republic controlled by the Han, many Manchu families lost their
livelihood and had to sell or rent out their houses to the richer Han people. Id. One
consequence of this change was that several families often found that they had to share
one siheyuan together instead of each occupying one as before. Id. Another consequence
was that many former Manchu banner men, in a desperate search for new employment,
became the first generation of professional policemen in China and one of their major
functions was to serve as guardians and mediators of their former neighborhood areas. Id.
Their familiarity with the traditional Hutong way of life and neighborhood norms greatly
helped them perform this new role. Id.
27 Liu YIDA, HUANGTIAN HouTu: BEllING YAN [THE ROYAL CAPITAL: BEUIJNG'S
PERSPECTIVE] 128 (1998).
28 In the 1950s, the first group of private houses the government took over belonged
to those who had followed the nationalist government to Taiwan and thus did not cause
any major social stir. Then the government required those who had been categorized as
capitalists to transfer to the government all of the houses they owned but did not
personally occupy. See id.
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space. While poor urban residents had lived in such multi-family settings for
a long time, it became a much more common phenomenon under the
communist government after 1949.29
The 1950s and 1960s saw a huge increase in China's population, and this
in turn created immense pressure upon housing space for people living in
Beijing.30 The communist government, preoccupied with its political
maneuverings and limited by its economic resources, was not able to provide
more housing for the Beijing residents for about three decades.31 During the
infamous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the earthquake of 1976, more
and more families were squeezed into existing Hutong neighborhoods. 32 To
accommodate burgeoning local populations, these families ingeniously
expanded their living quarters, not only into common courtyard areas, but
also into the Hutongs themselves, so that the Hutong alleyways became
narrower and narrower as people built makeshift sheds along them. Former
kitchens, which traditionally occupied the west side of a siheyuan
quadrangle, were quickly converted into family homes. To accommodate
this, people divided up the courtyard-usually equally among the
households-and built their own small kitchens. Trees and flowers were
sacrificed to make room for more essential living structures, common space
became increasingly scarce, and the distance between neighboring houses
decreased constantly.33
By the end of the 1970s, some architects sadly recognized that the
traditional siheyuan had all but vanished as a residential building, replaced
by the cluttered dazayuan, which consisted of random clusters of houses and
shelters of different sizes and shapes, crowded with so many people that it
was hard to find adequate space for almost anything.34 These changes made
29 These trends are discussed in general terms in WONG, supra note 11.
30 While we do not have accurate statistics due to the lack of official population
surveys for the period between 1949 and 1982, the number provided by Beijing
Population Association represents a good estimate. According to their statistics, the
population of Beijing increased from 4.14 million in the year of 1949 to 8.4952 million in
the year of 1979. BEUINGsHI BEUINGSHI RENKOu TONGJI ZILIAO [STATISTICS ON
BEIJING'S POPULATION] (Beijing Population Association 1995); see also Data, U.N.
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, at http://www.unescap.org
(last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
31 According to official sources, urban residential construction stopped since the mid
1950s and did not start again until the early 1980s. See YANG, supra note 20, at 211-13.
32 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
33 These trends were discussed in several of our interviews. See, e.g., id.
34 YANG, supra note 20, at 220-21. There are a couple hundred traditional sihuyuan
that have not been destroyed in Beijing, and they are now preserved as historical sites. Id.
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extensive daily interaction between neighbors inevitable, including daily
negotiations over the need to allocate common space on an equitable basis.
Within this context, harmony and cohesion within Hutong communities took
on a new importance. As one resident summarized it, "The only way to
survive in this kind of chaotic residential areas is to live with one another in
harmony." 35
When Deng Xiaoping initiated his reform plans for China in 1979,
Beijing's housing situation presented a serious problem. 36 By that time,
about two-thirds of the Beijing's 8.5 million people lived in Hutong
neighborhoods. 37 To alleviate space constraints, many families started adding
second floors to their courtyard buildings, and this caused several serious
accidents.38 Fire lanes were occupied and traffic jams became worse as more
shelters appeared along both sides of the already narrow Hutongs.39 Toward
the end of 1979, the municipal government of Beijing declared such shelters
illegal and ordered them to be removed.40
In order to solve the housing crisis, the government started a large-scale
construction program to build more high-rise apartment buildings. With the
advancement of the economic reforms, however, Beijing soon faced a more
fundamental structural change. The government began to demolish
traditional Hutong residential neighborhoods in order to make room for the
new, modern infrastructure which the city seemed to need to sustain its rapid
economic growth.41 Various demolition projects have been initiated since the
early 1980s, and many Hutongs have been flattened and replaced with
modern plazas, department stores, office skyscrapers, and residential high-
rises. As of today, official statistics show that there are only about 850
Hutongs left in Beijing, and less than one-fourth of its 13.82 million people
still live in these areas.42 In the Xicheng district alone, more than 260
35 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood (July 24,
2002) (notes on file with authors).
36 An illustrative example is that the marriage age was greatly delayed due to a lack
of housing. The average age for marriage was roughly extended by three years to 26 (for
men). Meanwhile, a lot of married couples had to live separately for a few years before
they could be assigned a room belonging to themselves. Id.
371Id.
38 Id.
3 9 1d.
40 YANG, supra note 20, at 220-21.
41 Id. at 221.
42 Id. at 221; see also supra note 14.
835
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Hutongs have disappeared since the 1980s. 43 Today, the Hutongs are
vanishing fast as demolition projects proceed with increasing speed.
These housing reforms and Hutong demolition projects have brought
significant demographic changes to the Hutong population, the most obvious
being that today's Hutong residents are mostly comprised of low-income,
poorly educated people.44 While the state assigned residential space to
individuals through their direct employment units,45 the new reforms opened
up channels for people to acquire new apartments. 46 The new reform policies
greatly benefited those equipped to participate in a competitive market
economy, namely those who are young and well-educated and who are able
to earn more money and move out of their Hutong residences. Poorly
educated working-class people, however, lost much of the privilege and
economic security they had enjoyed under the Mao regime, and they were
unable to benefit from the new opportunities presented by marketization. In
fact, the on-going reform of state-owned enterprises also means that many of
these working class people are being laid off as their employment units are
either closed or privatized, leaving them to face the perils and uncertainties
of the market alone. With no way of procuring better housing themselves,
many Hutong residents are forced to accept government cash compensation
or relocation to government-assigned apartment buildings-often far from
their old neighborhoods-as their existing neighborhoods are demolished.47
43 WONG, supra note 11, at 195.
44 Accurate statistics as to the economic situations and income levels of the Hutong
residents are extremely hard to find. From what we have gathered from our interviews
and surveys, however, we have a good estimate. The average annual income of these
Hutong residents appears to be significantly lower than the official number of RMB
39,000 (about $4,875) for the year 2001. The average annual income for Hutong residents
actually probably ranges from RMB 12,000 to 20,000 (about $1,500 to $2,500). For the
official number, see BEIJING DAILY, June 17, 2002, at 1.
45 Under the Mao regime, almost all houses were owned by the state, and they were
distributed to the residents through their own employment unit, such as a university or a
factory. As long as one was formally employed by these state-owned units, he or she was
entitled to be assigned at least a room to live in. The rent charged upon individuals for
these assigned houses was only symbolic. This privilege, however, only belonged to
urban residents. The huge costs of sustaining this housing system also made it almost
impossible for the already faltering national economy to find resources to build more
houses.
46 These channels include allowing individual residents to buy and lease from the
state, or to put money together through their employment units to have new apartment
buildings constructed.
47 To summarize, the first group to leave the crowded and chaotic Hutong dazayuan
areas included those whose employment units that were able to provide better housing
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Such urban development projects are part of a broader government effort
at urban housing reform. Over the last 20 years, the Chinese government has
attempted to accelerate privatization of urban housing, and this has resulted
in a property rights regime that is complex and constantly changing. In the
Hutong areas, where we conducted our research, ownership rights in both
land and residential structures are still mainly vested in the government. 48
The majority of Hutong residents were assigned to their current living
quarters by their work units ("danwer') before the 1980s, and they enjoyed
occupancy rights in their residences in exchange for extraordinarily low
rent.49 Only a small minority (we estimate less than 5%) actually own their
houses through inheritance, and, even in these cases, private ownership rights
only extend to the houses themselves, as all land in China-including land
under privately-owned houses-is owned by the government. 50 Additionally,
private homeowners cannot always legally sell their houses, especially if
other individuals enjoy countervailing occupancy rights through government
and those who could afford to gain access to new apartments through either connection or
money. The rest of the residents who can only depend upon government demolition
projects and compensation plans are often subject to huge governmental pressures.
Initially, the new apartments the government used to switch with their traditional houses
were often located in newly-developed areas farther removed from the city proper and the
compensation they got was often inadequate. In recent years, however, more and more
residents are resorting to legal means to protect their rights against the government
taking. This information was provided to us by a Qinghua Law School Professor, but we
were asked to keep them confidential. See also Interview with Residents' Committee,
Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22; Interview with Qianmmen President (unknown
date) (notes on file with authors).
48 As recently as 1997, "nearly 80% of the urban population was living in state-
owned housing." Eddie Chi Man Hui & Francis Kwan Wah Wong, Housing Reform in
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, China, 11 REV. OF URB. AND REGIONAL DEV. STUD. 141, 141
(1999). See generally Jieming Zhu, Changing Land Policy and Its Impact on Local
Growth: The Experience of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, China, in the 1980s, 31
URB. STuD. 1611 (1994) (discussing the new land policy in the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone and the implications for the populace of that area).
49 For instance, the actual rents in the mid-1980s still comprised barely 1% of urban
household expenditures and 6.5% of the full-cost rent. Zhong Yi Tong & R. Allen Hays,
The Transformation of the Urban Housing System in China, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 625, 634-
36 (1996). The reason for collecting such low rents on state-owned housing was both to
support the socialist conception of housing as a welfare good, and to enable the low
wages which formed the foundation of the urban state labor-management regime. Id.
50 See generally Ok-kwok Lai, Governance and the Housing Question in a
Transitional Economy, the Political Economy of Housing Policy in China Reconsidered,
22 HABITAT INT'L 231, 234 (1998) (discussing reforms by the Chinese Government in
housing policy).
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assignments. 51 Thus, most Hutong residents are painfully aware that property
rights in urban housing are still uncertain, hard to untangle, and often subject
to arbitrary negation by the government, work units, and even individuals in
valid possession of the property. As might be expected, the precarious nature
of housing ownership rights generally deters residents from seeking
ownership stakes in the houses they inhabit, and this contributes to their
general sense of economic insecurity and disadvantage.
All these recent changes have given the term "Hutong" a somewhat
negative and derogatory connotation both economically and culturally,
although the term also conveys a feeling of nostalgia. To say somebody is
from a Hutong often implies a lack of good education and good taste; the
Hutong way of life is generally considered outdated and not in keeping with
Beijing's more modernized lifestyle today.52 Fortunately, the Beijing
Institute of City Planning and Design has listed nineteen Hutong and
"siheyuan" quadrangles as historical and cultural protection sites to be
exempted from demolition under future urban development programs. 53
B. Social and Spatial Intimacy: Hutongs as Residential Environments
Today
Upon first glimpse, the Hutongs in Beijing might appear all the same
with gray walls and worn bricks and a few trees or plants lining one side.
Traditional-looking gates leading to individual courtyards dot and decorate
both sides of the narrow alleyways. Toward one end of a Hutong, one can
usually find a public water fountain with a cement sink. On the other end are
the public toilets. Against the walls on both sides of the alleyways, one finds
51 This is to say nothing of the makeshift structures built by residents in common
courtyard areas. These structures evidently are not even protected by a private right of
occupancy, as they are not officially registered with the central government. Legally
speaking, these structures do not exist.
52 The younger generation despises the fact that the close proximity of Hutong
households offers no privacy: The younger generation also considers modem facilities
such as private bathrooms a necessity. Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai
Hutong neighborhood, supra note 35. Through our interviews, we also found out that
about one-third of our subjects had been laid off or forced to retire from a former state-
owned enterprise and are now either doing random jobs or searching for new
employment. The majority of those who talked with us do not have a college education.
53 143 BEIJING MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES 72 (2001). These 19
preservation sites are those Hutongs and "siheyuans" that have maintained their
traditional features without being occupied by multi-families and transformed into
"dazayuan" under the communist regime.
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numerous bicycles and occasionally a crude brick and cement shed that was
built in earlier years. On a quiet early summer afternoon, there are usually
few people out in the Hutongs, often only retirees and young children. They
are usually engaged in their own activities while enjoying the sunshine, a
resource that has become very scarce inside their own living quarters due to
the overcrowding of makeshift buildings in common courtyard areas. Toward
evening, the Hutongs become much more lively as residents come back
home from work. Many actually take their dinners outside to eat together
with their neighbors, comparing and sharing each house's special culinary
recipes. When it gets dark, more people come out into the Hutongs to chat,
play chess or mah jong, eat watermelon, or watch small televisions, since
their own bedrooms, lacking air-conditioning and good ventilation systems,
are usually too hot to stay inside.
This is a familiar scene in almost any Beijing Hutong on a summer night,
and many residents facing demolition of their residential quarters
emotionally refer to this kind of communal lifestyle as a major reason why it
is hard for them to give up what they know is, materialistically speaking, a
rather shabby living environment. "Hutongs," said the residents, "are a happy
kind of place where you enjoy a lot of interpersonal communication and
sharing, despite our poverty and lack of space."'54
It is true that poverty and lack of space are undeniably characteristics of
Hutong areas today. The Hutongs themselves are often badly in need of
repairs with their narrow streets full of pits and holes which become muddy
on a rainy day. The courtyard households vary in size but are uniformly
overcrowded. A typical courtyard houses at least four families today, with an
average of roughly 20 people sharing about 15 rooms on the four sides of the
courtyard. The courtyard is no longer an open space, but rather a cluster of
ugly sheds which function as kitchens, storage rooms, and even bedrooms.
To get into one's own house, a resident must carefully navigate a
labyrinthine maze of small buildings and bicycles. 55 These families share one
54 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra,
note 35. These sentiments actually echo the scholarship of Jane Jacobs and others, who
have recognized the distinction between material wealth (physical capital) and overall
community health and vitality (social capital) in American cities. Jacobs has decried the
negative impact of urban development programs on the social health of American city
neighborhoods. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIEs 3-
25 (1961); see also WONG, supra note 11, at 192.
55 This is a description of one of the poorest and most crowded quadrangle
courtyards we saw during our interviews. While most of the courtyard buildings we
visited could boast a little more open space and wider passages leading to each individual
house than this one, they all share the same characteristic of having a bunch of makeshift
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common entrance gate that opens onto the nearest Hutong. The gates are
usually aesthetically appealing, bearing traditional Chinese architectural
designs and decorations while functioning as a protective barrier against
outsiders.
Sharing a single entrance gate also creates a feeling of sharing one
common inner world among the families. 56 Hutong residents tend to identify
two communities in which they live: (1) the inner community of those
families who share one courtyard, and (2) the outer community of residents
from the courtyards located along the same Hutong. 57 Although these two
communities often overlap, residents do see them as distinct, and, socially
speaking, they are most strongly aligned with those neighbors who live in
their courtyard.58 The social and spatial context of the Hutong residential
neighborhoods thus presents inhabitants both opportunities for frequent
friction and disputes, and the potential to build large stores of critical social
capital. While neighborly disputes vary, they often involve the limited
common areas in the courtyards. 59 Different sorts of noise and odor
nuisances have long become an inevitable part of life for Hutong residents, 60
and limited common space is often subject to conflicting ownership claims
sheds built by individual households in the formerly common courtyard. This observation
came from our visits to the following five Hutong areas during the summer of 2002:
Jianguomenwai. Hutong, Yabaolu Hutong, Liulichang Hutong, Qianmen Hutong, and
Houhai Hutong. Although we are only discussing the characteristics of these five areas,
they are quite representative of the Hutongs left in Beijing today.
56 A caveat we need to make here is that the single families that used to occupy such
siheyuan buildings often included several generations, especially for the middle-class
people who could not afford to get an independent house for each grown-up child. In a
sense, the family was composed of several "small families" that each occupied one side
of the siheyuan. To outsiders, they were one single family, while inside they had to do a
lot of intra-family and inter-generational negotiations and adjustments. According to
some old residents with whom we talked, dealing within the family was even harder than
dealing with neighbors without any blood relationships. The fact that many Hutong
residents had this kind of previous experience, however, helped facilitate the multilateral
adjustments among the different families now sharing one siheyuan. Interview with
Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 35.
57 1d.
58 Id., see also LIANG, supra note 26, at 131.
59 For discussion of typical disputes, see infra Part V.
60 This issue will be further discussed infra Part V. One nuisance that used to
present a serious problem before the 1970s was smoke from burning coal for cooking and
heating-the city finally sent gas to these Hutong houses in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra
note 35. The Hutong residents really appreciate this improvement. Id. Storing a huge
amount of coal for the winter also made the courtyards more unbearable spatially. Id.
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(or proposed uses) among families. 61 The fact that the families sharing the
same courtyard often have only one wall separating them from one another
leaves families exposed to public scrutiny. Knowledge of neighbors'
personal lives provides fertile soil for gossip and minor disputes. 62 One
resident asked us rhetorically:
As the Chinese proverb puts it, "Pots and pans inevitably collide with each
other in every household." How can you expect people of different
characters living so close to each other to have zero confrontations? But, we
accept this as part of our life and we do not let them seriously disrupt our
neighborly relationships, as that is not the right thing to do. 63
The close physical proximity of the Hutong residences and the inevitably
daily interactions among neighbors create a strong need for mutual
dependence and reciprocal cooperation.64 Such bonding social capital has
become an essential part of the Hutong way of life to the residents. This is of
especially great value to lower-class working residents who have few outside
resources, either economic or administrative, on which to rely. The political
regimes under which the residents have lived have not been very efficient in
providing a safety net.65 Further, the harsh economic situation many
residents face today renders the social capital invested in their immediate
neighborhood communities even more important. Despite their frequent
friction over mundane issues, residents have a strong sense of sharing both
benefits and burdens with their neighbors. They look out for each other and
61 Our interviews show that these kind of disputes occur most often among Hutong
residents. A typical example would be one family building their kitchen either slightly
wider or taller than those of the neighboring families in the courtyard. Id. This taller shed
could block sunlight from the other sheds and also cause more water to fall upon the
neighboring roofs when it rains heavily. Id.
62 For discussion of typical disputes, see infra Part V.
63 This comment was made by Huang Yongyu, a 67-year-old resident who had lived
in a Hutong house all her life and wished she could die there. Interview with Resident
Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 35.
64 For discussion of enforcement of mediated solutions, see infra Part VII.
65 The last three dynasties-Yuan, Ming, and Qing-were not able to have their
ruling power penetrate down to the neighborhood level, and pretty much left the local
residents to manage their own livelihood while relying upon the traditional Baojia system
to police them. The communist regime tightened its control over every citizen politically
and economically, and significantly limited the scope of urban residents' employment.
Once the government was no longer able to provide sufficient employment opportunities
in the 1980s without simultaneously establishing an effective social security mechanism,
many Hutong residents found themselves left in the cold of the new economic reforms.
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depend upon each other in performing many basic tasks of everyday life,
such as childrearing, housekeeping, and maintaining social order. The
children in any given courtyard generally grow up together, often under the
common care of the grandparents and parents of all the neighboring
families.66 While the lack of distance and space deprives residents of their
personal privacy, it also furnishes a formidable public supervision system
that contributes to public safety and promotes mutual adjustment and
cooperation. 67 In short, the extensive interdependencies among the Hutong
residents cause the residents to view responsibility-sharing as a part of life.
One resident articulated this sentiment nicely during an interview:
While it might appear to you that our courtyard is too crowded and chaotic,
maybe even poor and shabby, we enjoy living here because the neighbors
help each other immensely when one encounters any kind of difficulty. For
instance, two nights ago the Zhang family living on the west side of our
courtyard found their grandmother suffering from a heart attack. Every
family went out to help. The young men took turns carrying her to the
nearby hospital, as it was hard to get a taxi or ambulance into our Hutong at
three o'clock in the morning. While the Zhang family members stayed at
the hospital for the last two days, the neighbors each cooked some food for
them and sent the food to the hospital, while at the same time taking care of
their 11-year-old kid. I wonder where else one can find such cooperation
among neighbors. Certainly not in those new apartment buildings, where
next-door neighbors might not even know each other. 68
Indeed many of the residents who had spent their whole lives in Hutong
areas saw many advantages to living in such a close-knit community: They
do not have to lock their doors, as the neighbors watch out for each other;
they have a safe neighborhood; working parents do not need to worry about
their school-age kids, as the neighbors look after them; the sick and the
elderly are looked after by neighbors when family members are away; people
out working do not have to worry about their laundry being dried outside
66 The residents who talked with us emphasized this bonding factor in dealing with
their disputes. Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood,
supra note 35.
67 In the course of our field research, we were often confronted by watchfl
residents when we knocked on an absent neighbor's door. The residents always wanted to
know who we were and what we wanted. There is a strong sense that each household
must help monitor and protect the security of neighboring families.
68 This comment was made by Qin Jiangong, a 64-year-old Hutong resident at the
Jianguomen Wai Hutong. Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong
neighborhood, supra note 35.
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when the weather changes; one's mail is always picked up on time;
neighbors guard their common interests against outsiders; the Hutongs
provide a lively environment for kids to play and for peddlers to sell their
wares 69; there are always people with whom to chat and exchange gossip,
which allows residents to keep up with contemporary events both within and
outside the neighborhood; and there are always neighbors to share good food
and tea with, which is especially important to older people whose social
activities are severely limited.70 In summarizing this perspective, one
resident put it this way: "There are both a lot of advantages and
disadvantages to our living environment. There are a lot of costs and benefits
to all ways of life, and we have to weigh these costs and benefits carefully to
gain a balance in our approach to life."'71 Poverty and interpersonal friction
thus coexist with extensive cooperation and social bonding everyday in
Hutong neighborhoods, providing a perfect environment for the study of
extralegal dispute resolution methods.
C. Standing at the Crossroads: The Importance of the Timing of This
Study
Beijing Hutongs are disappearing fast. While there are still about 900
Hutongs left, most of these have big white circles on their gray walls, with
69 The dense population living in these courtyard clusters attracts many peddlers.
ZHANG, supra note 11, at 379. This was especially true during the earlier decades before
the current market economy was developed. Id. From morning until night, peddlers
selling different daily necessities and providing basic maintenance services toured these
residential areas, rendering the life of the residents physically convenient. Id. While this
aspect of Hutong life is disappearing nowadays due to the establishment of more
supermarkets, many older generation residents have a deep nostalgia for it. See id.
70 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra
note 35. When we were visiting this Hutong neighborhood, we ran into Mr. Chen Lifa, a
former resident who had moved to a new apartment building about ten miles away. He
told us he missed his life and his neighbors in his former Hutong so much that he bought
a month bus pass in order to come back everyday. When asked what was so appealing
about the Hutong life, he sighed: "I feel so lonely in my new apartment though I get to
enjoy all the modem facilities like a gas stove, a central heating system, and a private
bathroom. I just miss the friendly environment of the Hutong where everybody knows
about each other." Id. He then more or less listed the comments we discuss here. When
asked whether he wanted to move back he said, "I wish I could combine both the material
aspects of my new apartment with the Hutong human relationship and atmosphere." Id.
71 This comment was made by He Lianrong, a Hutong resident and a neighborhood
committee worker. Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District,
supra note 22.
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the Chinese character for demolition in them. 72 These circles clearly
symbolize to those passing by that yet another Hutong neighborhood will be
flattened by bulldozers in the near future. To those living in these Hutongs,
however, the white circles symbolize the future destruction of a way of life
and the denial of an important element in Beijing's history. While many
people in China today do think that these residential areas should be
preserved as historical sites, the traditional Hutong way of life still appears to
be out of tune with the rapid modernization efforts underway in Beijing. The
younger generation in particular aspires to a more Western style of living,
seeking the increased freedom, independence, and privacy afforded by self-
contained apartments. However, the many contradictions associated with
modernization give some a sense of nostalgia for the close-knit communities
of Hutong life. Many residents living in new apartments say that they often
feel isolated and alienated from their neighbors. While they still feel the need
to depend upon a strong social network, the apartment-dwellers find this
network missing in their new living environment.73 This is one reason that
both local governments and residents of new apartment buildings have
initiated "community-building" programs in recent years. 74
This study seeks to capture one important aspect of the disappearing
Hutong way of life in Beijing: the Hutong residents' dispute resolution
regime, which includes the relationship between traditional social practices
and formal law within this regime. This study, we believe, promises not only
to contribute to a better understanding of this specific traditional dispute
resolution regime, but might also provide important lessons for other
communities-in China and elsewhere-facing the cultural strains of rapid
modernization and the complex task of remedial "community-building." The
timing of this study is important, as we have managed to interview
individuals whose neighborhoods are facing imminent demolition. Standing
at the crossroads of tradition and modernity, these residents have provided us
with their unique insights in considering and comparing two distinctive ways
of life.
III. RESEARCH METHODS
We pursued our research primarily through face-to-face interviews with
Hutong residents, Residents' Committee mediators, and Neighborhood
Police Officers in the summer of 2002. In all, we conducted interviews with
72 See Adhikari, supra note 14; Will Beijing's Hutongs Vanish?, supra note 14.
73 See supra text accompanying note 70.
74 This campaign continues in Beijing. See WONG, supra note 11, at 192.
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65 residents of the Hou Hai, Jianguomen Wai, Liu Li Chang, Yabao Lu,
Taiping Jie, and Qianmen Hutong areas of Beijing. We met with eight
Residents' Committee mediators from the Jianguomen Wai and Yabao Lu
Hutong neighborhoods and examined their records of resident disputes and
mediation activities covering the time period from May 2001 to May 2002.
75
We also accompanied a Neighborhood Police Officer on a full day of rounds
in a Hutong neighborhood and witnessed his activities firsthand.
76
The neighborhoods we visited collectively encompass both historic,
well-touristed Hutongs designated for governmental preservation as well as
less famous areas targeted for demolition. Each resident interview involved a
fairly in-depth discussion, generally ranging from half an hour to two hours
in length. Some of the interviews were conducted in groups, while others
were done on an individual basis. Friends in Beijing helped us arrange
interviews with relatives or friends living in Hutongs, and these interviews
tended to be the longest and most comprehensive. 77 Other interviews were
with residents chosen at random as we visited these neighborhoods
repeatedly over several months.78 Our interviewees included residents older
than 80 and as young as 25. Some had lived in their current residence less
than one year, while others had lived in the same Hutong 50 years or more.
One resident reported that his family had lived in the same Hutong for six
generations. 79 We interviewed both men and women, literate and illiterate,
employed and unemployed. Though most residents evinced a willingness to
meet with us-some even invited us into their homes for food or drink-our
results may overrepresent the helpful and outgoing. Some residents did
refuse to participate in interviews because of suspicion or impatience. Many
of our interviewees were illiterate and most were distrustful of formal written
surveys (especially when administered by a foreigner). These difficulties
75 There were six volumes of records for this period, containing official accounts of
80 disputes between residents in the Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood.
76 We took this unique research opportunity on August 27, 2002. The police officer
we accompanied was uncomfortable with publicity and requested that we not report his
name. Our findings from this excursion are discussed infra Part V.C.
77 A special note of thanks is due to our wonderful friends in Beijing, without whose
help this study would have been far more difficult and far less fruitful. In particular, Liu
Xiaoyan, Liang Lihua, Zhuang Shuo, and Wu Bo provided invaluable assistance in
arranging interviews, helping us orient ourselves in the Hutong neighborhoods, and
providing occasional (but vital) translation assistance.
78 This includes interviews conducted during our observation of a Neighborhood
Police officer's rounds in a Hutong area on August 27, 2002.
79 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood (June 19-July 10,
2002) (notes on file with authors).
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precluded the use of standardized written surveys for data-gathering, and we
soon discovered that more informal, conversational approaches were far
more fruitful modes of research. 80 All interviews were conducted entirely in
Mandarin.
In every interview we covered certain basic topics regarding the
mechanics of available dispute resolution mechanisms and the methods used
to resolve certain paradigmatic disputes types: property damage, physical
fights, conflicts over use of common courtyard areas, noise complaints,
allocation of water and electricity costs, etc. These common lines of
questioning provided a certain continuity and coherence to the interview set,
which allowed us to gain a consistent baseline understanding of the Hutong
social world and its basic norms. Yet we also solicited more idiosyncratic,
personalized accounts of memorable events. We always encouraged residents
to elaborate on basic principles with illustrative stories. In this way, we tried
to glean an understanding of the more general norms and principles that
undergird Hutong social life, while simultaneously capturing the more
colorful details of particular cases. Our interviews with the mediation
"experts" in the Residents' Committee and our examination of the Residents'
Committee mediation records also allowed us to cross-check resident
accounts of the dispute resolution process, the norms that guide the process,
and the typical outcomes of common dispute types.
Contrary to our initial apprehensions, Hutong dispute resolution
mechanisms and the basic norms employed by residents proved strikingly
uniform from neighborhood to neighborhood. Similarly, the more "expert"
perspectives of the Residents' Committee mediators and the Neighborhood
Police officers were highly consistent with the reports offered by individual
residents. This overall consistency of results across disparate institutional and
geographical contexts allows meaningful reference to a single Hutong
dispute resolution "regime" encompassing a more or less coherent body of
norms and institutions. It is to this regime that we now turn.
80 This methodological approach obviously lacks a certain amount of statistical
rigor, but it is consistent with research methods used by other major scholars in the field.
The study whose methodology is most similar to ours is Robert Ellickson's research on
the resolution of cattle trespass disputes in Shasta County, California. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County,
38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 654-57 (1986).
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IV. THE THREE-TIERED HUTONG DISPUTE RESOLUTION REGIME
A. Institutional Scaling and the Basic Menu of Dispute Resolution
Options
The Hutong dispute resolution system is organized into three
fundamental tiers, or layers, each involving different institutional actors and
implying distinct dispute resolution methods-an arrangement that can be
termed institutional scaling. When a dispute arises, residents choose the tier
that is best suited to their own needs and the contingencies of the specific
dispute at hand, and they will change tactics and move between tiers of the
system (or re-scale) as circumstances demand, especially if the dispute
escalates or proves intractable. 81 While our specific findings and research
data will be discussed in the next section, it will be useful first to present the
broad outlines of the Hutong dispute resolution regime and its three
institutional tiers.
Simple informal neighbor-to-neighbor negotiations make up the first tier
of the dispute resolution system, and indeed this is the default first option for
residents who have grievances with their neighbors. 82 Neighbor-to-neighbor
negotiations often involve just the two parties involved in the dispute, but
other nearby residents may participate, especially if they share common
courtyard space or close social ties with the disputants. This mode of dispute
resolution typically involves no formal rules whatsoever, so solutions are
81 The centrality of pragmatism in choosing dispute resolution mechanisms, as well
as the availability of several different institutionalized dispute resolution options, echo
the conclusions of other research in the field, particularly the recent scholarship of Mark
D. West. See West, supra note 4, at 303 (reporting that Japanese citizens often decide to
respond to karaoke noise pollution "through a bureaucratic pollution complaint resolution
mechanism" rather than formal litigation based on consideration of the economic costs
and social consequences of each alternative); West, supra note 5, at 200-01 (finding that
Japan's National Sumo Association applies both formal association rules and informal
social norms in resolving disputes and the choice between using rules or norms is based
on a calculation of comparative efficiency).
82 The dispute resolution literature has created standardized terms to refer to the key
elements of any dispute. "Grievance" refers to any complaint one individual has against
another, "claim" refers to the aggrieved party's request for satisfaction or a certain
solution recognizing the aggrieved party's entitlements, and a "dispute" emerges when
such a claim is rejected. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 525, 527 (1980-
1981). While this standardized vocabulary has certainly proven useful in developing the
dispute resolution literature, our use of these terms generally will reflect their colloquial
meanings.
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customized and flexible, formulated by the mutual consent of the parties
involved and tailored to their specific needs (often with input from concerned
neighbors). Similarly, there is no role for coercive state power or public
institutions in this first tier, nor is there any formalized procedure involved-
an aggrieved resident will simply approach the offending neighbor and
suggest they discuss the problem privately.
The second tier of the Hutong dispute resolution system involves more
formal mediation of disputes by the local Neighborhood Residents'
Committee " ('juwei hui")83 or special Neighborhood Police ("pianer
jing")84-unique institutional actors that we characterize as "non-legalistic
public authorities." The Residents' Committee is a small body directly
elected each year by residents of the neighborhood to handle certain common
tasks (such as garbage disposal and sanitation) and to oversee
implementation of certain public policies (like the one-child policy).
Committee members are typically elected from among the neighborhood's
residents and tend to be respected members of the local community. They are
paid salaries with public money, and at least one of them-typically one with
a reputation for fairness and good judgment-will have a specialized
mandate to mediate disputes between residents.
Residents involved in disputes with their neighbors can call the
Residents' Committee and request that one of its members come and mediate
("tiao jie") the dispute. The Residents' Committee representative will then
meet with the parties to the dispute, hear accounts of events from both the
parties and any neighbors who may be able to shed light on disputed facts,
and try to find common ground between the disputants. After such a meeting,
the Residents' Committee representative will usually suggest that a certain
solution is in the best interests of the community, and the disputants are
urged to agree to it. Such resolutions usually impute some responsibility for
the dispute on both parties as a way to demonstrate neutrality and allow all
involved to save face.85 The special Neighborhood Police play a similar role,
but in an even more informal, ad hoc way. Neighborhood Police officers are
members of a special branch of the municipal police assigned to patrol
certain urban districts as general social "troubleshooters." Like the
83 For a detailed discussion of the current role and historical evolution of the Juwei
Hui as a dispute resolution institution, see our discussion infra Part IV.B.
84 For a detailed discussion of the current role and historical evolution of Pianer
Jing as a dispute resolution institution see our discussion infra Part IV.C.
85 The general position and function of the Residents' Committees is common
knowledge in Beijing, and was gleaned through our formal interviews of friends in
Beijing and out time spent living there.
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Residents' Committee, these special police are available to mediate disputes
on request. However, more commonly, they make regular rounds through the
neighborhood checking on residents, inquiring about recent residential
conditions, and ensuring that emerging problems are contained. 86
Though both the Residents' Committee and the Neighborhood Police are
paid from the public fisc, they are distinctly non-legalistic institutions: They
apply no formal rules in their mediation of local disputes, observe no set
procedural requirements, and have no power to impose fines or other
penalties on disputants. 87 Instead, mediation leverages the existing social ties
of the Residents' Committee members and the Neighborhood Police officers
to the community, and is guided by shared principles of justice and common
social understandings, giving the process both predictability and moral
legitimacy in the eyes of residents. 88 The resulting mediated solutions are
thus much more flexible and customized than those imposed by formalistic
legal institutions, but they are constrained somewhat by the shared principles
of the community and the demands of preserving institutional legitimacy-
disputants do not enjoy the complete tabula rasa that characterizes informal
neighbor-to-neighbor negotiations. Similarly, although no public coercive
power is involved, resorting to this second tier involves intervention by a
public authority acting in the name of the community, and this mobilizes
86 Id.
87 All 65 residents we interviewed insisted that no pre-formulated rules were used by
either institution in mediating disputes. In fact, many residents seemed mystified at our
suggestion that formal legal rules could efficiently resolve local disputes. Even the
Neighborhood Police, who theoretically have access to formal legal institutions and the
coercive powers of the municipal government, typically did not refer to formal law when
resolving problems between residents. Additionally, the Neighborhood Police do not
have cars, are not armed, and are generally not authorized to use force against residents.
The non-legalistic public authorities encountered in this study are evocative of the
"pollution complaint counselors" who often handle karaoke noise pollution disputes in
Japan. See West, supra note 4, at 303. Like the Hutong Residents' Committee and
Neighborhood Police, Japan's specialized noise-complaint counselors appear to be
effective at resolving private disputes despite their lack of formal coercive power. Id.
88 The fact that members of the Residents' Committee are themselves residents of
the community is undoubtedly crucial to the effectiveness of this institution. In her study
of the role of norms in law enforcement, Tracey Meares has found that such "horizontal
relationships" between legal authorities and common people are crucial to building trust
in the law and fostering compliance with legal rules. Tracey L. Meares, Norms,
Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 393 (2000) ("[R]elationships
between law enforcement authorities and the people matter more than consequences
imposed by authorities to produce compliance with the law, in part because the desire of
individuals to comply with the law is powerfully connected to their self-esteem.").
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social pressure and the exigencies of public shame to enforce mediated
resolutions. 89
The third tier of the Hutong dispute resolution regime is comprised of
formal legal institutions such as municipal police, Public Security Bureau
("gongan ju") personnel, and the court system. These institutions bring the
full weight of formal law, legal procedure, and the coercive power of the
state to bear on disputes within their ambit.90 As a result, this third tier
involves higher economic costs (including transaction costs), more social
disruption, and a greater threat of punitive sanctions than the two lower tiers.
Additionally, since formal legal rules--or policy decisions by political
elites-are involved, solutions are not particularly flexible or customized.
The residents of Beijing Hutongs thus employ a three-tiered scalable
dispute resolution regime, the different layers of which imply varying
degrees of legalism, cost, flexibility, social disruption, and access to state
power. This system is evocative of more general dispute resolution
typologies in the literature, but with a unique and subtle twist. Most of the
leading law and society scholarship presents a basic distinction between the
world of "law" on the one hand and the world of informal "norms" on the
other. Under the conventional view, "law" (or other formalized rules) and
"norms" are seen as presenting disputants with two binary options for dispute
resolution. 91
89 See infra Parts IV.B & IV.C for discussion of the mechanics of mediation through
these institutions and the enforcement of mediated solutions.
90 The role of law and procedure are measured relative to the other dispute
resolution methods discussed here; no certain level of procedural rigor or commitment to
the rule of law is implied.
91 The foundational work in this area is Robert C. Ellickson's Order Without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes, which originally proposed laws and norms as alternative
bases for dispute resolution. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1. While the literature has
certainly acknowledged that dynamic interaction occurs between formal laws and
informal norms, with each affecting the development and application of the other, the
basic treatment of formal law and informal norms as separate and distinct has persisted.
See also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338, 342-43 (1997); Meares, supra note 88, at 391-92; Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2051-53 (1996); Sunstein,
supra note 9, at 907-10.
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Laws and other written rules92 are commonly associated with official
(usually legal) institutions, adherence to some form of legal procedure (with
its associated costs), and the application of coercive public power to enforce
resolutions. "Norms," on the other hand, are commonly associated not with
formal institutions or procedures but with informal enforcement regimes
relying on social sanctions.93 Within the China Law literature, leading
scholar Donald Clarke similarly distinguishes between "external" and
"internal" dispute resolution mechanisms in Chinese society: "External"
systems involve third-party mediators who have "no distinct relationship
with the parties other than a specialized function as [a] dispute resolver"
(such as formal legal institutions), while "internal systems" employ
mediators who have authority "not because of [their] specialized function as
dispute resolver[s] but because of some other distinct relationship with the
parties" (such as family members). 94
Yet, the dispute resolution regime discussed here is not binary, but
tripartite. The first tier-informal neighbor-to-neighbor negotiation-
certainly fits the traditional view of norm-based dispute resolution, as well as
the "internal" category of Clarke's typology. No formal procedures are used,
no pre-formulated rules are applied, and no formal institutions are involved.
Individuals participate in mediation or negotiation because of their social
relationships with disputants or their physical proximity to the disputed
events. The third-tier of the Hutong regime similarly fits the traditional
conception of rule-based dispute resolution and Clarke's related "external"
category. Lawyers, courts, and the police are summoned as neutral dispute
resolution experts with no prior relationship with the disputants, official
procedures are followed, formal laws are applied, and state power is enforced
to produce an officially-mandated resolution.
The Hutong regime's second tier-that of the Residents' Committee and
the Neighborhood Police-lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
Both the Residents' Committee and the Neighborhood Police are institutional
actors that specialize in dispute resolution, yet they also act as members of
the disputants' community, enmeshed in the same web of social relationships
as the disputants themselves. Indeed, as will be discussed, much of their
92 The distinction between norms and formalized "rules" is fuzzier than that between
norms and laws (and accordingly more analytically problematic). Nonetheless, we would
contend that it is still useful (or at least not incoherent) to distinguish between written,
codified rules enforced by formal institutions on the one hand and non-codified,
informally-enforced community norms on the other. See, e.g., West, supra note 5, at 200-
01.
93 See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 123-24.
94 Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245, 248 (1991).
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moral authority stems precisely from their generalized social connections to
disputants as fellow neighbors and sharers of a common social context. 95
These two institutions are formalized and "public" in the sense that they are
paid with public funds, have a mandate to represent community interests, and
are established as government organs by formal elections or other legal
procedures. Yet they are not able to apply coercive power in sanctioning
parties, and they generally do not employ formal rules in resolving disputes.
Some minimal level of formal procedure may be applied, especially by the
Residents' Committee when summoned to mediate standing disputes, but this
is often applied unevenly and tailored to the exigencies of individual cases.
This middle layer of non-legalistic public authority in Beijing Hutongs
suggests that the traditional distinction between laws and norms should be
reconsidered, or at least, the standard assumption that the use of informal
norms precludes intervention by public institutions should be softened. As
will be discussed, our field research suggests that institutionalized non-
legalistic public authorities can play a vital role in developing and enforcing
informal social norms, and indeed they can often use norms to broker
negotiations more efficiently and productively than purely private
negotiators. Before discussing the specific mix of dispute resolution methods
actually employed by residents, it will be useful to first introduce these
unique but central institutional actors-the non-legalistic public authorities-
in more depth.
B. Non-Legalistic Public Authorities I The Residents' Committees
("Juwei Hui')
To many contemporary Chinese urban residents, the term "juwei hui"
evokes images of a group of women, largely housewives, ranging from 40 to
70 years in age, who are very (perhaps overly) enthusiastic about their
neighbors' affairs. The younger generation, who often find the Residents'
Committees activities too intrusive, often sarcastically refer to Committee
members as "bound-feet detectives." 96 Yet despite such tongue-in-cheek
95 See Meares, supra note 88, at 393 (emphasizing the importance of "horizontal
relationships" between government authorities and citizens in promoting law
enforcement).
96 The term "bound-feet" conveys two connotations. The first refers to the age of the
typical women who worked for the neighborhood committees when they were first
established in the early 1950s. As we will discuss later on in the Article, the first group of
women recruited to work for the neighborhood committees tended to be those old-aged
women who had lived in the particular neighborhood for a long time. As most of these
women were born before the 20th century, they tended to have bound feet. The second
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caricatures, Residents' Committees have played and continue to play an
important role in the provision of certain basic public services at the street
level, including neighborhood dispute resolution. Indeed, during the course
of our research, when asked what they do when they cannot resolve disputes
among themselves, residents would invariably answer: "Go to thejuwei hui."
Neighborhood Residents' Committee ('juwei hui"), though a term coined
in the early 1950s, was not an novel invention of the current Chinese
government. Historically, the Chinese judicial structure has received
reinforcement from a community mutual-responsibility system known as the
baojia system, which can be traced back to the early Han dynasty (206 B.C.-
220 A.D.).97 While the baojia system did not always perform as well as the
central government had hoped, the concept of preserving an orderly
community through mutual supervision and responsibility has persisted in
Chinese society. 98 When the Nationalists (Guomindang) overthrew the last
imperial dynasty and established the first Chinese Republic in 1911, they
found themselves again resorting to the baojia system, despite their eager
efforts to reform all the traditional means of administration.99 The
Guomindang government, however, failed to gain a tight control over the
countryside and quickly saw the mutual-security system loosen amid
constant internal warfare. 100 Drawing upon this lesson, the Communist Party
started its version of the baojia system early on its journey to power. While
still fighting the Guomindang in the Civil War of 1945-49, the Communist
Party instituted "mutual guarantee" groups in the communities it controlled,
with each group composed of volunteers willing to supervise each other to
ensure a reliable community. 101
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finally took over power in
China in 1949, it organized study groups where citizens were made to learn
connotation refers to the womens' old-fashioned and often outdated but very stubborn
way of doing things. Today, obviously, it is the second connotation people are
emphasizing when they use the term.
97 For further discussion of the baojia system, see generally MARK ELVIN, THE
PATTER OF THE CHINESE PAST (1973); PING-TI Ho, STUDIES ON THE POPULATION OF
CHINA 1368-1953 (1959); KUNG-CHAuN HsiAO, RURAL CHINA: IMPERIAL CONTROL IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (19'60); and JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN
CHINA 125-26 (2d ed. 1999).
98 See generally SPENCE, supra note 97.
9 9 ZHONGHUA MINGUO SHIGANG [BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 418-
19 (Zhang Xianwen ed.); see also SPENCE, supra note 97, at 350.
100 See supra note 99.
101 WEINAN FANG, DANGDAI ZHONGGUOSHI [CONTEMPORARY CHINESE HISTORY]
353 (1997); see also SPENCE, supra note 97, at 456.
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about the new political regime and its ideology. 10 2 Through such study
groups, the CCP leadership gradually set up a network of street-committee
branches. 103 In addition to their purely political functions, the street
committees, organized by neighborhood, also worked on public service
projects such as street cleaning and maintenance, running night school
programs for the illiterate, taking care of the elderly and small children while
young adults were at work, supervising water and other utility supply, and
administering health and vaccination programs. 104 They also assumed the
traditional public security responsibilities of their predecessors under the
baojia system, monitoring their neighbors and enforcing various political
policies ordered from above. 105
In the early 1950s, these street-committee groups adopted the more
formal title of Neighborhood Committee of Urban Residents ("chengshi
jumin weiyuanhui," or its abbreviation "]uwei hui") and were widely
established in the traditional residential areas of Beijing.' 0 6 The CCP
leadership, based upon its experience of rural mass mobilization, understood
the vital importance of extending its power down to all sectors of society. It
carefully recruited those who were enthusiastic about the Communist Party's
political campaigns to participate in the newly established committees,
especially female Party activists who stayed at home-and thus could police
their neighborhoods-during the work day. 107 While these committees were
never formally part of the Party's organizational structure-their members
were not required to be members of the CCP-they were regarded as
102 See generally Essays in Part I, in 14 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA: THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1949-1965 (Roderick
Macfarquhar & John Fairbank eds., 1987); MAURICE MEISNER, MAO'S CHINA AND
AFTER: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1986).
103 MEISNER, supra note 102.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 For this paper, we use the term "Residents' Committee" to refer to this
institution.
107 See generally CHRISTINA K. GILMARTIN, ENGENDERING TIHE CHINESE
REVOLUTION: RADICAL WOMEN, COMMUNIST POLITICS, AND MASS MOVEMENTS IN THE
1920s (1995). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) already had a long history of
mobilizing women first in its efforts to gain mass support in the countryside before
entering the urban areas. Originally, they did this in accordance with their campaign of
"liberalizing women." Later on, they realized the huge influence Chinese women could
exert in their households and communities and began to consciously recruit women into
its various movements.
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extended branches of the Party's municipal governments. 10 8 Committee
members were not formally compensated, and their services were considered
voluntary before they were gradually professionalized in the late 1980s.109
Of course, the Residents' Committees also played a significant role in
dispute resolution, just as their predecessors did under the old baojia system.
This role was actually enhanced and expanded when the CCP leadership
successfully banned all private practice of law and limited the application of
legal expertise to certain government ministries and the state-controlled
judiciary in the early 1950s.l1 0 Additionally, Mao's influential 1957 article
"On Contradictions" distinguished between what he envisioned as "inner-
contradictions among people" from "contradictions between people and their
nemesis," and declared the latter must be handled through aggressive judicial
action against "class enemies." I Il Thus, during this era, mere appearance in
court carried a huge stigma. The Chinese people tended to envision law as a
means of punishing class enemies through a system of courts and prosecutors
who concentrated on the political rather than the legal aspects of given
cases. 112 As a result, most of what might be termed civil cases were handled
108 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
109 In reality, they received different kinds of subsidies from the municipal
government. Id. Many subsidies were intangible and could mean a lot to those who had to
live through many political campaigns. Id. For instance, the members of these
neighborhood committees could learn of many kinds of administrative policies earlier
than the ordinary citizens and could make preparation in advance accordingly. Id. This
privilege was of great significance when many varieties of food were supplied to urban
residents on rations in the early 1970s. Id.
110 The CCP viewed the steady growth of legal expertise which was cultivated in the
later years of Guomindang rule a forceful threat to its dictatorship and dismissed most of
the skilled practitioners in the legal profession in the 1950s. In 1959, the Ministry of
Justice was abolished altogether, along with any organizations of lawyers. Law school
students decreased and only studied political rather than legal matters at school. The
Ministry of Public Security took over and dealt with both criminal and political offense as
national-security matters. This situation lasted until 1978, when the government began to
reassemble the rudiments of a legal system. For further discussions, see generally
CHINESE FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (David Buxbaum ed., 1978); CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES (Jerome Cohen ed., 1970); VICTOR Ho LI, LAW WITHOUT
LAWYERS (1977); and HENRY ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW (1988).
111 Mao drafted this article in 1957. THE SECRET SPEECHES OF CHAIRMAN MAO
FROM THE HUNDRED FLOWERS TO THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 131-89 (Roderick
MacFarquhar et al. eds., 1989) (transcript of original version of Mao's speech on the
same topic). Mao's distinction between these two kinds of "contradictions" remained
hugely influential upon people until late 1980s.
112 See generally HO LI, supra note 110; ZHENG, supra note 110.
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at the local city-ward level by mediators. Neighborhood Residents'
Committee members often assumed this responsibility. 113
As economic reforms gathered momentum after the Mao era ended in
1976, the context within which Residents Committees operated underwent
dramatic change. The more affluent Hutong residents started to move to
newly built apartment buildings where they could enjoy more privacy and
greater creature comforts. Even for those who stayed on, a general
decentralization of political power rendered the central CCP leadership less
forceful and penetrating. People began to resist surveillance, supervision, and
criticism from their neighborhood Residents' Committees.114 Most Hutong
residents now wanted their neighborhood Committee members to act not as
agents of the government, but rather as respected members of the community
who could provide public services and effective mediation without the taint
of political ideology.
Under such circumstances, both reform-minded intellectuals and
ordinary citizens called for the professionalization and democratization of the
Residents' Committees.1 15 In response, many former members of the
Committees resigned under great social pressure, and this led to the direct
election of some Residents' Committees in the late 1980s.116 Local
municipal governments also instituted systematic reforms that included
hiring more qualified personnel for positions in the Residents' Committees,
providing training courses in dispute resolution, and paying these
professionals regular annual salaries instead of merely providing them with
subsidies. 117
113 Id.
114 It was during this period of time that the nickname for the neighborhood
committee members, "bound-feet detectives," appeared and quickly spread all over the
country. Young people especially enjoyed ridiculing these neighborhood activists.
Residents' Committee members who years earlier were labeled model mediators by CCP
newspapers now surely had become laughingstocks.
115 This trend was discussed in several of our interviews, including Interview with
Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
116 Grass-roots democratization and direct election at the neighborhood level,
together with its counterpart at village level in the countryside, presents a complicated
issue that cannot be fully covered in this section. Suffice it to say that it is a movement
that is still ongoing and deserves further study.
117 When we visited the neighborhood committees, we were very impressed with the
size of their offices and the staff who worked there. While many committee members
used their own households as offices in the previous decades, nowadays, they work in
quite formal office spaces, equipped with many file cabinets and bookshelves. One such
committee has five offices located in five different alleys of the neighborhood. Most of
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Committee members today are assigned to different departments in
charge of different administrative functions, and they need to attend regular
training sessions at the municipal level. 118 Official guidelines promulgated
by the municipal government now require that Committee members who
work as dispute mediators be "fair-minded, linked with the masses,
enthusiastic about mediation work, cooperative with fellow workers, and
equipped with a certain level of knowledge about the law and current
policies."'1 9 The Residents' Committees in Beijing Hutong areas still serve
as extended branches of the central government for the purposes of
publicizing and implementing certain national policies; however, the scope
of this function is much more limited than in previous decades. 120 During our
research interviews, Committee members and residents alike listed the
following policy areas-often in coordination with the local government-as
being administered by the Residents' Committees: national family planning
policies, 121 campaigns against prostitution and drug addiction, the
administration of certain forms of social welfare, 122 and providing mediation
in civil disputes among the residents.123 Although residents vehemently resist
the staff are still women, but they are much younger in age and better educated. Many
had worked outside the neighborhood but had been laid off due to the economic reforms.
118 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
119 Guidelines on Electing Neighborhood Residents Committee Members,
Neighborhood Residents' Committee Office, Yabao Hutong, Beijing (Sept. 6, 1995) (on
file with authors). Note that the previous requirement of a correct political attitude was
discarded and the need for a certain level of legal knowledge was added. This change
reflects the general trend of having neighborhood dispute mediation less politicized.
120 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
121 This function is still closely related to the Committees' control of household
registration information, a traditional function of such neighborhood groups. The
members are still responsible for paying close attention to those who live in their
neighborhood and their guests to ensure no "outside-plan" pregnancy. They are fined if
they fail to perform this function and more births occur than allowed.
122 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
This includes periodically compiling the records of those who need various government
subsidies or compensations, updating data about household registration, and distributing
welfare money. They also organize various programs for those elderly people who do not
have support, as well as some child care. It is rare for them to organize activities like
street-cleaning or groups studies these days, but some neighborhood committees are now
raising funds to establish neighborhood reading-rooms and entertainment centers. A
serious task they have to deal with nowadays is trying to come up with ways to help those
workers who have recently been laid off. Many committee members touched upon this
issue but were reluctant in further discussions. Id.
123 See discussion infra Part VI.
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unwanted interference in their household affairs, they insist that in other
areas of life the Committees provide invaluable services as mediators.
As will be discussed more fully in a later section, Residents' Committee
mediation is still deemed the most appropriate means for resolving minor
disputes involving real property, debts, nuisances in the neighborhood,
marital or family problems, 124 and compensation for minor damages or
injuries. In mediating resolutions to these disputes, Residents' Committee
members still regard preserving community harmony and preventing social
disturbance as their primary goal. In the course of these efforts, shared
community norms, not formal laws, structure the mediations and inform
eventual resolutions. Written rules are almost never invoked in this process,
and disputes are generally resolved according to shared community social
norms. Commitments to cooperation, reciprocity, and preserving existing
social relationships are much more important than actual statutes or
ordinances. Additionally, as the Residents' Committee has no coercive
sanctioning power of its own, achieving resolutions always depends upon the
mutual agreement of the parties to the dispute. 125 An internal Residents'
Committee case record describes the dispute resolution process as follows:
When we carried out our mediation task, we tried to talk to both sides
instead of just one. We always made efforts to make sure that they could
perceive the dispute issue from the perspective of the other side. In doing
this, we reasoned with them using common norms and morality and we
persuaded them through touching them emotionally. While we are against
"unprincipled mediation" with the only goal of reaching a compromise
without paying attention to who is right and who is wrong, we do think that,
in ordinary disputes, it is important for both sides to be more considerate of
the other side and to be willing to compromise on those matters which do
not concern principles. 126 This is a excellent tradition of our nation and we
need to preserve it in order to best serve our public values and interests. 127
124 In our interviews, a number of residents responded to our question regarding
family disputes by emphasizing that many such disputes actually reach a better resolution
when mediated by neighborhood committee members. When we pressed about the
traditional principle of not letting family discord known to the public, they pointed out
the changing environment and generation gaps. They stated that many young people paid
less attention to family unity than before and their parents were thus often forced to seek
outside help. For further discussion, see infra Part VI.
125 For more detail on this mediation function, see infra Parts V, VII.
126 The meaning of the word "principle" in China has undergone significant changes
in recent years. Before the 1980s, it was used to mainly refer to the CCP's political
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In short, despite the continuous shifting of political policies in the
decades since 1949, the mediation of minor disputes in Chinese society has
maintained most of its traditional characteristics in the hands of the
neighborhood Residents' Committees. 128 The Committees represent a unique
institution that is still vital to effective street-level dispute resolution in
present-day urban China, and, as in times past, this institution derives its
relevance and authority principally from traditional cultural preferences for
mediation, government support of its activities, and adherence to the shared
social norms of its constituent residents. One Hutong resident summarized it
nicely:
A lot of changes have taken place since the 1980s, and there has been more
and more talk about resorting to legal means. But traditional consciousness
cannot be replaced within a short period of time, and the law remains a long
distance from ordinary people. Unless there is really no other alternative,
we common residents simply are not willing to litigate against each other in
the courts. These neighborhood Residents Committees, though far from
perfect, do provide useful forums for helping ordinary citizens resolve their
disputes without going to court. 129
The specific community norms that inform Residents' Committee
mediations-as well as private negotiations between neighbors-will be
discussed at length in Part IV of this paper. But first, we must address one
other distinctive "non-legalistic public authority" that is central to street-level
dispute resolution in Beijing Hutongs-the Neighborhood Police.
policies and the residents' attitude towards these policies. Today, it concerns much more
about the public norms of morality and justice.
127 Record of a dispute resolution case filed with the neighborhood Residents'
Committee office located at Jinbao Hutong, Beijing (Mar. 11, 2002).
128 The interaction between tradition and various political campaigns was a common
topic mentioned by committee members when we conducted our interviews. They kept
emphasizing that political campaigns come and go, but the goal of their mediations was a
traditional and a long-term one: to keep the harmony of the neighborhood. In achieving
this goal, they had to use political rhetoric in order to make their agreements sound
politically correct under various political circumstances, but the theme of reaching a
dispute resolution through reasonable compromise and conforming to public standard of
norms was always persistent.
129 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood (Aug. 26, 2002)
(notes on file with authors). The person who gave this comment is a middle-aged woman
who had lived in that neighborhood for 47 years, and those who were present all nodded
in agreement.
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C. Non-Legalistic Public Authorities II: Neighborhood Police
("Pianer Jing")
Between the neighborhood Residents' Committees and the formal legal
institutions of the state exists another semi or sub-administrative mediation
agent: the Neighborhood Police ("pianerfing"). Although they are a part of
the formal police system and they do wear police uniforms, Neighborhood
Police officers are clearly distinguished from the other, more formal sectors
of the police bureau. They constitute a special section of the police force
charged with guarding their assigned neighborhoods and serving as
mediators when they encounter disputes among residents. 130 Although
summoning public authorities to resolve neighborly disputes is often
regarded by Hutong residents as a hostile and anti-social act, relying on the
local Neighborhood Police officer for mediation is apparently widely
accepted as standard practice.
One major difference between the Neighborhood Police and the rest of
the police force lies in their standard mode of operation. Usually one
Neighborhood Police officer is assigned to a residential area under the
purview of a single Residents' Committee, generally consisting of about
three to eight Hutongs-depending on the geographical size of these Hutongs
and their population densities.131 The Neighborhood Police officers come to
residents without being summoned; indeed they conduct an informal
"troubleshooting" tour of their assigned Hutongs each day, and they are
familiar with almost every family within these neighborhoods. Most of the
officers have grown up in a similar residential environment, and through
their work, they have learned to identify with the specific interests and
concerns of their assigned Hutong neighborhood. 132 According to one
Hutong resident, "pianerfing are not considered 'real' police, as they are not
formal. They are more like mass workers or mass mediators who help the
neighborhood people solve their difficult problems, including disputes."'133
130 Due to the lack of scholarly literature on this issue, description of many of their
functions are denied from our observation and conversations with the neighborhood
policeman who kindly agreed to take one of us on one of his routine tours through the
Hutong neighborhood.
131 Interview with Police Officer, Yabao Lu Hutong Neighborhood (Aug. 27, 2002)
(notes on file with authors).132 Id.
133 Id. By using the term "mass workers," Mr. Lin invokes an image of these
neighborhood police performing political rather than legal functions. Meanwhile, it also
implies that the neighborhood police are considered insiders rather than outsiders in the
social network of the Hutong communities.
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Neighborhood Police officers do not have their offices in official police
bureau buildings. Rather, they have their own small offices in the
neighborhoods they are assigned to, and they go to official police bureau
offices only to attend meetings or make special reports. Many of them do not
even use their small neighborhood offices very often, as they are out making
their rounds in the Hutongs for most of the workday. "The residents' houses
are our posts," said one officer. 134 The neighborhood police also often do not
don their uniforms when working in the neighborhood, although the residents
clearly know who they are. Additionally, the officers do not carry any
weapons and they ride bicycles rather than drive police cars. 
135
An examination of the roles performed by the Neighborhood Police
during their daily rounds through the Hutong neighborhoods confirms the
fundamentally extralegal, norm-based nature of their mediation and patrol
activities. During the course of our research, we had an opportunity to
accompany one Neighborhood Police officer on his daily rounds in the
Yabao Lu Hutong district. Rather than offer abstract generalizations about
Neighborhood Police functions, it is probably more illuminating to give a
brief summary of the things this officer actually did over the course of his
workday.
His day started at 8:00 a.m., when he rode his bicycle into Yabao Lu
Hutong. He first stopped by the office of the Hutong's Residents' Committee
and chatted with the people working there, asking them whether there was
any information he needed to know. The Committee members exchanged
some information about the residents' birth control program with him.
He then went to a household in which both the husband and the wife had
recently been laid off from a state-owned enterprise. There, he talked with
them for about an hour, providing information about potential employment
and educational opportunities while they complained about their situation.
He then wrote them a certificate which would be helpful in having their
child's school tuition waived, though it needed to be approved and stamped
by his boss.
From there, he went to visit an elderly man who was sick in bed and
whose adult children were away in other cities. He helped the old man pick
up his gas stove and confirmed that the old man was getting money from his
kids regularly. He reiterated to the old man that he had a legal right to be
supported by his adult children and that he could bring them to court if they
134 Id.
135 An illustrative example is that they usually do not stop drivers who violate traffic
rules, though they might write down the relevant information and have such information
sent to their colleagues. Id.
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did not perform this obligation. After that, he was invited to have lunch in the
household of one resident whom he referred to as "an old friend."
In the afternoon, he paid a visit to a family whose son was doing jail time
in a different province and told them to keep writing letters to the son to
encourage him. The family complained to him about being discriminated
against in their neighborhood because of this, and he promised to do
something about it.
Next, the officer went on to a courtyard and called two neighbors
together to talk with them about a long-term dispute they have with each
other. The dispute originated when one neighbor claimed that the other had
spread irresponsible rumors about his wife and now the two households
refuse to talk with each other. The neighborhood policeman obviously had
talked with them about this issue before, and he tried hard to initiate a
dialogue between the two parties through "persuasive reasoning and
emotional appeals."'1 36 He also pointed out that their discord had made the
other families in the courtyard feel an awkward tension, and that all their
neighbors were eager to see them make up. 137
In performing these kinds of tasks, the Neighborhood Police seek to
provide community services rather than enforce legal regulations. In this
sense, they more or less perform the traditional role of a headman or a clerk
to the magistrate courts in earlier historical periods. When China first
organized its professional police force towards the end of the Qing dynasty,
the police retained this traditional function of serving as mediators for local
disputants. 138 In fact many members of the first post-imperial Beijing police
force were former Manchu bannermen, themselves Hutong residents and
skilled mediators among their neighbors.139
136 Id.
137 Amid these routine visits, the policeman did admit that he often felt bored with
these tasks, but he enjoyed the trust and bonding he shared with the Hutong residents he
talked with. He once described his role as a "caretaker." Id.
138 For a full account, see LIANG SHIQIU, LIANG SHIQIU SANWEN 162-65 (Zhonguo
Guangbo denshi Chubanshe 1989). As Liang describes it, these first generation police
saw themselves more as clerks than as policemen. Their position was not as prestigious
as professional law-enforcers but rather local guards ensuring orderly relationship among
the neighbors. They were not accorded high authority and could only earn respect and
authority through their personal skills. The reason was that Chinese tradition had power
to enforce laws and rules retained in the administrative system and the army, while the
police were a newly-formed force under the Western influence and part of the new state-
building program of the late Qing and the early Republic period. Id.
139Id.
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Under the communist regime, the state saw the police as an effective
means to thrust totalitarian political institutions into every sector of Chinese
society. In order to strengthen the CCP's control of the entire citizenry, the
regime designated a special branch of the police force to function as a semi-
administrative agency, monitoring city residents along with the neighborhood
Residents' Committees.1 40 These special Neighborhood Police were
officially charged with preventing or suppressing any potential public
disturbance before it posed a threat to government authority. 14 1 In this
respect, the political mission of the Neighborhood Police overlapped with
that of the neighborhood Residents' Committees discussed above. 142 From
the 1950s to the 1970s, police mediation was largely politicized as a method
of enforcing state policies. Officially at least, the Neighborhood Police aimed
at enforcing politically correct thought and behavior among the Hutong
residents.143
In practice, however, the Neighborhood Police retained many of the
more traditional headman functions, even during these politically charged
eras. They still defined their role as mediators according to the more
traditional, custom-based dispute resolution regimes that had functioned in
their native neighborhoods for generations. While the state asked them to
literally enforce government policies, in reality they more often adhered to
the traditional preference for compromise while paying lip service to political
rhetoric. 144 One Neighborhood Police officer made this point quite
succinctly: "The way we mediate here is that while the central government
has central policies, we have our own ways of dealing with them."145
According to both Hutong residents and the officers themselves, the reason
for this is simple: Mediation can only be productive through compromise and
flexibility.
140 Interview with Police Officer, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note 131.
141 Id.
142 For discussion of the Residents' Committee, see supra Part IV.
143 According to the neighborhood policeman we followed, the chance of their
career promotion is closely related to the rate of crime and public disturbances in their
respective residential areas. Although going to court or calling the police to solve
disputes is no longer considered public disturbance as of today, it still does not reflect
well in the evaluation of a neighborhood Police officer's work. "The best result we try to
achieve," he said, "is harmony without any discord in our neighborhoods. While it sounds
impossible, we hope to at least dissuade some of these discords through our peaceful
mediation." Interview with Police Officer, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
131.
144Id.
145 Id.
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To conduct their mediation work effectively, the neighborhood police
work hard to be on good terms with the Hutong residents. They also maintain
their own "reliable information network" through which they can learn of
problems without being summoned by the disputants themselves. 146 Officers
generally approach disputants as fellow members of the community so that
they do not appear too official or imposing.147 To gain trust from residents,
they present themselves not as agents of the government or the police bureau,
but rather as real members of the community, only with more experience,
wisdom, and authority. Accordingly, their authority seems to come more
from the sense of justice they exhibit in their mediations than from their
official titles as police officers. 148 As the residents and the Neighborhood
Police both told us, the success of their daily job, and thus their career,
depends more upon their solid and trusting relationships with Hutong
residents than their official power, which is negligible. 149
In the mediation process itself, the main goal is to uphold community
social norms and preserve relationships among neighbors rather than disrupt
them. The Neighborhood Police thus often base their mediation approach
upon the twin principles of community harmony and reciprocity, persuading
disputants to assess their own positions from this same perspective. As in
mediations performed by Residents' Committees, formal legal rules are
146 Id.
147 In one instance, a Neighborhood Police Officer learned through casual
conversation with residents that the relationship between two neighbors was becoming
strained and a fight might take place. He took the initiative to investigate the facts and
intervene as a mediator. Upon learning that the dispute was over the amount of electricity
fee one resident ought to pay, the officer approached the one who demanded payment
first and calculated with him the electricity fee for the previous year. Then he approached
the neighbor owing money by explaining the situation from a neutral standpoint. This
worked, he explained, because it was easier for the two parties to calm down and become
more willing to assume their own responsibility when he intervened as a third-party in an
informal way. Id.
148 Though this statement is at least somewhat doubtful as one wonders how any
individual could clearly distinguish between these two aspects, especially within the
Chinese political context, almost all the residents we talked with emphasized this point.
They actually told us about a certain neighborhood policeman who was quite corrupt as a
mediator and would take side with any party who bribed him. That policeman totally lost
their respect and trust and had to be removed in the end. Id.
149 "Pianering" is the lowest rank for any police officer under the current police
system in China. Many of them do not have the right to be equipped with weapons.
Therefore, they need to do their job really well in order to be promoted to the higher rank
of the police system and to be accorded more power.
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almost never applied, and coercive sanctions cannot be imposed directly.150
One neighborhood policeman explained this approach in some detail:
In mediating disputes by smoothing away any social discord, we prefer to
use extra-legal means rather than formal legal rules as the traditional means
often better reflect the need to place oneself in the other party's shoes. The
principle of reciprocity is the best to preserve a good relationship between
the neighbors. This time, you give up some interests while the other side
gains, but next time you will gain while the other side remembers what you
did earlier and willingly give up some of their private interests. This
traditional way of Chinese thinking has worked for us for over two
thousand years and there is a reason for that. Today's legal rules are based
upon similar moral standards but they are also based upon discrete fact
patterns. When the relationship between the neighbors is a continuous one
rather than an isolated one, resorting to these legal rules without any room
for compromise and reciprocity would deeply hurt people's feelings and lay
foundation for more future discords. Furthermore, it is still easier for us
common people to accept traditional ideas than the new legal terms and
rules despite the government's efforts to implement the rule of law today.
We, as commoners, as long as we do not commit crimes, find it better to
follow extra-legal but just and historically proven moral norms.151
Thus, quite apart from the activities of the Residents' Committees, the
Neighborhood Police act as an additional fundamentally non-legalistic
mediating authority that Hutong residents can consult when disputes occur.
They serve as an important link between more formal legal dispute resolution
channels and the Hutong residents' social practice, and they rely primarily
upon informal community norms in gaining residents' trust and mediating
between disputants. While they may refer to legal rules in their mediations,
especially during today's era of legal reform, 152 they do not structure their
mediations according to legal rules. Instead, they see their success as
mediators depending primarily upon their skillful deployment of local norms
and customs.
In sum, Hutong residents have several institutional options in resolving
their disputes with neighbors. As has been discussed in this section, these
options span vastly different sets of institutional actors and imply differing
levels of legalism, formalism, and coercive state power. Most interesting here
150 In rare cases, the Neighborhood Police might report a particularly serious dispute
to their colleagues at the police bureau, but this is rarely done and, in any case, residents
can call the municipal police themselves if they are so inclined.
151 Interview with Police Officer, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note 131.
152 See supra Part IV (describing a Neighborhood Police officer's daily rounds).
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are the unique set of "non-legalistic public authorities"-the local Residents'
Committees and the Neighborhood Police-that lie somewhere between the
domains of private bargaining and public law. We will now turn to a more
detailed examination of our research results and discuss exactly which
dispute resolution methods Hutong residents prefer for certain common
dispute types, and why they tend to prefer these methods over others.
V. THE PRIMACY OF NORMS IN HUTONG DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As mentioned in the opening passages of this paper, a rich literature has
underscored the primacy of informal norms in governing relations between
individuals in a wide array of legal, institutional and social contexts. 153
Extralegal norms, 154 it has been found, may be especially important in what
Robert Ellickson has termed the "close-knit" group: "a social network whose
members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of power
against one another and a good supply of information on past and present
internal events." 155 In such communities, strong intra-group social ties not
only facilitate the creation of potent group-specific norms, but also allow
members of the community to enforce these norms through informal,
extralegal sanctioning of intransigents.156
In fact, our field research revealed a strong universal preference for
norm-based, informal methods of dispute resolution among Beijing Hutong
residents. The residents we interviewed reported a distinct bias against using
formal legal rules or involving formal legal authorities in their affairs, which
they generally regarded as inefficient and potentially troublesome. Of the 65
Hutong residents we interviewed, many of whom had lived in the same
neighborhood since the 1950s, not one had ever hired a lawyer or been
153 See discussion supra Part I.
154 Of course one must be careful in using the term "norm" to explain human
behavior. As Cass Sunstein has cautioned, "norms" really explain nothing if they are
cited to account for "any apparently anomalous result" that appears exogenous to the
prevailing legal regime. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 945. For the purposes of this paper,
"norm" simply refers to an extra-legal principle or social understanding, not codified but
shared by the members of a community, which may be used to determine individual
entitlements or otherwise guide resolution of disputes. Such a "customary norm emerges
in a community when it is internalized by enough members," and long-standing social
practice, rather than formal institutionalization, confers legitimacy and predictability on
the dispute resolution regimes that it governs. Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social
Theory, 22 J.L. & Soc'Y 50, 63 (1995).
155 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
156 See id.
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involved in litigation, and none reported ever calling the police about a
dispute with a neighbor.' 57 In fact, most were quick to insist that relations
with their neighbors were harmonious, and that they were not the kind of
contentious people who would involve public authorities in private disputes.
Residents similarly reported a disinclination to summon third-party
mediators from the Residents' Committee or the Neighborhood Police unless
it was absolutely necessary. Despite the informal, rule-free nature of such
mediations, less than one third of the residents in our interview sample
reported seeking mediation through either of these institutions. 158 Non-
legalistic public authorities like the Residents' Committee did appear to play
a prominent role in the life of the community generally, however, as almost
all interviewees reported regular contact with Residents' Committee
members and Neighborhood Police Officers in some capacity. 159 Many
interviewees also reported participating in Residents' Committee mediation
of disputes involving other residents. But the vast majority of the residents
we interviewed insisted that they preferred never to initiate third-party
mediation. A baseline preference for informal, ad hoc, neighbor-to-neighbor
negotiations was thus a constant refrain in our interviews, with norm-based
mediation by the Residents' Committee or Neighborhood Police being a
viable second choice, while invocation of formal rules (of any kind) or
157 As will be discussed later in this section, residents did report that individuals in
their neighborhood had called the police or consulted with lawyers on rare occasions, but
all of our 65 interviewees insisted that they had never resorted to such measures
themselves.
158 Twenty of the 65 residents interviewed (31%) reported personally summoning
the Residents' Committee to mediate a dispute. Sixteen of these were residents identified
in Resident Committee dispute records, while just four of them were from interviews of
randomly selected residents. This suggests that the actual rate percentage of residents
who have summoned Residents' Committee mediators may be much smaller than 31%. It
should be noted also, however, that many residents reported being at least peripherally
involved in dispute mediation, often concerning disputes involving third parties. Aversion
to involving Residents' Committee mediators in private disputes varied somewhat by
neighborhood, with residents in some areas reporting almost no use of such institutions,
while others reported consulting third-party mediators only on rare occasions (perhaps
once or twice per family). In all cases, there was a clear preference to avoid third-party
mediation if private neighbor-to-neighbor negotiations were possible.
159 The Residents' Committee in particular serves several functions beyond
mediating dispute resolutions. The Residents' Committee typically is responsible for
seeing to repairs of public, street-level property, arranging for neighborhood garbage
collection, carrying out government propaganda campaigns, and overseeing
implementation of the national one-child policy. Thus, even though residents generally
disfavored involving the Residents' Committee in private disputes, they generally had a
lot of contact with the Committee in these other areas.
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resorting to formal legal institutions were highly disfavored and accordingly
rare.
Over 90% of the residents we interviewed reported that there are no
written rules governing the use of common courtyard areas in Hutong
neighborhoods. 160 In other words, there are no official nuisance rules as that
term is understood in the West. Instead, informal social norms dictate that
each household may use the area around its doorway (roughly two square
meters in area) in any way it wishes. 161 The remaining courtyard areas-
which generally account for most of the space in any given courtyard-are
recognized as common space, and any proposed use of these areas must be
approved by the other households adjoining the courtyard (i.e., any single
neighbor is able to veto any proposed use). 162 This creates a variant of what
Heller has termed an "anticommons" in common courtyard areas. 163
Alternatively, to invoke Calabresi and Melamed's oft-cited typology, this
scheme effectively grants all residents two entirely norm-based property-rule
entitlements: one allowing them absolute control of designated household
areas near their doorways and another granting them veto-power over
proposed uses of common areas. 164
Under this regime, direct neighbor-to-neighbor bargaining generally
resolves uncertainty as to what uses of common space are acceptable, just as
the Coase theorem would predict, 165 and the preferences of nearby neighbors
are generally respected in this process. Of course, obstinate neighbors or
particularly noxious uses or encroachments on common space can lead to
intractable disputes. The Residents' Committee will step in to mediate
between parties when private negotiation fails. We interviewed members of
160 Specifically, 33 of 35 residents in one interview set (94%) confirmed this fact.
161 This norm was consistently cited in our field interviews, and seemed to represent
something of a universal norm of property entitlement. As far as the residents are aware,
it has no basis in Chinese law.
162 See id.
163 Heller discusses this concept with regard to intellectual property rights in the
biomedical field in Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation?: The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99
(1998).
164 For Calabresi and Melamed's celebrated distinction between property rules and
liability rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1105-15
(1972).
165 For Ronald Coase's revolutionary theory of determining individual entitlements
through extralegal bargaining, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 8-44 (1960).
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one household who had summoned the Residents' Committee to mediate a
dispute with a neighbor who insisted on raising pigeons-and hence allowing
them to discharge certain bodily functions-directly above the complainants'
doorway. 166 Another case we encountered involved a resident whose pet dog
repeatedly relieved itself in common courtyard areas. 167 In both cases, the
Residents' Committee successfully intervened to vindicate the norm-based
entitlements of the complainants, persuading the offending party to avoid
such messes. 168 Disputes over the use or expansion of kitchen facilities in
courtyard areas also appeared typical, 169 with private negotiations or
Residents' Committee intervention similarly serving to uphold norms
protecting property entitlements in courtyard spaces.
Resolution of noise complaints are also the exclusive province of
informal norm-based solutions. The prevailing norm dictates that residents
refrain from making more noise than is "necessary" under the
circumstances. 170 Residents' Committee mediators whom we interviewed
reported that they were often summoned to mediate sometimes colorful
disputes between neighbors embroiled in escalating battles of intrusive
noisemaking. 171 In one memorable case, a family responded to the noisy
activities of a neighboring child by repeatedly banging on the walls and
heating ducts connecting the two residences. The other family responded by
encouraging the child in question to make as much noise as possible over the
next several days. The Residents' Committee was eventually summoned to
166 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
167 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
129.
168 In the latter case, the Residents' Committee had actually promulgated an
unofficial local policy against dog ownership to avoid precisely this problem. After
suffering repeated transgressions, the complainants considered consulting higher
government officials, but decided against it because there was no apparent official legal
rule supporting their position.
169 At least three interviewees offered unsolicited examples or accounts of such
disputes, while others made general reference to their occurrence within the community.
Kitchen facilities are commonly placed in or near courtyard areas for ventilation reasons,
thus they often physically infringe on common space or otherwise compromise public use
of these areas by generating smoke, odor, or refuse.
170 In American nuisance law, "reasonable" would likely be the operative adjective,
but the residents we interviewed consistently referred to the normative standard by using
the word "necessary."
171 Since Hutong residences are typically extremely old and often poorly
constructed, they do not absorb noise very well. Accordingly, noise-related disputes are
common, cited by a large number of our interviewees as examples of typical conflicts
between neighbors.
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admonish both parties to limit noise emissions to the minimum level
demanded by their daily activities. No codified rules or standards were ever
invoked, but there were no further complaints from either family. 1
72
Residents' Committee mediators also reported applying this "necessity"
norm to noise disputes between residents and nearby construction teams or
neighbors conducting renovations. 173 In such cases, construction projects and
renovations are generally considered "necessary," but the parties responsible
for them are commonly asked to make some kind of concession to the
aggrieved. 174 n one case, this involved money payments from a construction
team to a nearby resident; 175 in another, a family was persuaded to alter the
daily schedule of its renovation work to accommodate an elderly neighbor's
afternoon naps.176 Again, legal nuisance rules were never invoked by any of
the parties to these disputes.
Informal social norms similarly govern most cases of property damage.
Shared norms dictate that residents should compensate others for property
damage wrought by themselves or by their children, unless they are
financially unable to pay. Generally, parties bargain privately to determine
the amount of the damage payment. However, if parties cannot agree on a
fair amount, or if the accused party denies responsibility for the incident, the
Residents' Committee may be required to intervene. One Residents'
Committee mediator recounted an incident in which a child destroyed a
neighbor's roof-mounted television antenna. The child's parents resisted
paying damages on the grounds that a child could not be held responsible for
these types of destructive activities. The Residents' Committee intervened
and convinced the child's parents to pay for professional repair of the
antenna; however, they also suggested that the aggrieved family repair their
roof, since damaged roof tiles may have contributed to the accident. 177
Despite close parallels to the American comparative negligence standard of
tort liability, this solution was completely extralegal, and no reference was
made to formal Chinese law.178 Cases of catastrophic property damage may
172 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra
note 35.
173 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
129.
177 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
178 Id. This dispute also reflects the Chinese tradition of mutual compromise,
whereby both parties to a dispute are encouraged to make concessions.
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require using formal legal institutions, especially when these incidents also
involve bodily injuries, but these contingencies will be discussed in the next
section. 179
The cases and dispute types cited here merely represent some of the
clearer, more memorable examples of the Hutong dispute resolution regime's
overall norm-based orientation. While certainly not an exhaustive account,
these examples are representative of general Hutong dispute resolution
practices, and they allow one to glimpse the complex, norm-driven world
uncovered by our research. While it is clear that Hutong residents commonly
structure their world according to norm-based individual entitlements and the
informal mediation activities of non-legalistic public authorities, such as the
Residents' Committee, the considerations that drive these preferences are
nuanced and complex. It is to this topic that we now turn.
VI. WHY NORMS?: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE CHOICE
BETWEEN NORMS AND LAW
Some have advanced cultural or legal-development explanations to
account for the primacy of extralegal norms in certain communities. 180 With
respect to urban Chinese communities specifically, one study observed that,
in intra-group conflicts, U.S. ethnic Chinese rely on gossip and "informal
social pressure" to resolve disputes, while members of other ethnic groups
appear more likely to file lawsuits against each other in court. 181 Certainly,
deep-rooted cultural morays have a role to play in establishing community
practices, but other research suggests that resort to extralegal norms may be
the result of pragmatic, efficiency-driven considerations. 182 Once strong
social norms are established, it often becomes more efficient to structure
certain interactions according to extralegal norms rather than codified legal
rules.183 As Lisa Bernstein concluded in her study of contract relationships in
modern business settings, "[r]ational transactors might deliberately leave
aspects of their contracting relationship to be governed, in whole or in part,
by extralegal commitments and sanctions. '' 184 Resort to informal social
norms in dispute resolution thus does not necessarily evidence a lack of
179 See infra Part VI.
180 Merry, supra note 8, at 899, 913.
181 Id.
182 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1788 (1996).
183 Id.
184 Id.
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sophistication or legalism in the community at issue, but may rather represent
rational calculations of costs, benefits, and the comparative efficiency of
social norms versus legal rules in a given context. 185
In fact, these sorts of comparative efficiency considerations are exactly
what our field research uncovered in Beijing Hutong communities.
According to our interviews, individual cost-benefit analysis often proves
decisive in the selection of dispute resolution methods by Hutong residents.
Rational calculations generally led individuals to choose informal, norm-
based, extralegal mechanisms, such as neighbor-to-neighbor negotiations or
norm-based mediation by the Residents' Committee, over recourse to formal
legal institutions. 186
A. Time, Money, Uncertainty and Social Disruption: The Many Costs
of Formal Legal Solutions
Among the prototypical elements of any cost-benefit calculation are
monetary costs and time requirements, and these figured prominently in
Hutong residents' evaluation of their dispute resolution options. Most
interviewees seemed genuinely amused by our inquiry as to why they never
consulted with lawyers or engaged the machinery of the court system. Their
grinning answers were quick and uniform: "I don't have the money or the
time." 187 None of the individuals we interviewed had ever seriously
considered hiring a lawyer, largely because lawyers are prohibitively
expensive to retain. At a citywide average of roughly $1,500 to $2,500 (U.S.)
per year, the income of a normal Hutong resident is not sufficient to pay
attorney's fees, even in China's nascent legal services marketplace. 188
Apparently, at one time the Beijing municipal government made lawyers
185 See Ellickson, supra note 80, at 686 (finding that rational calculations of the
transaction costs associated with formal legal solutions generally lead California cattle
ranchers to base individual entitlements on informal norms); West, supra note 5, at 165,
200-01 (observing that the Japanese National Sumo Association uses both informal
norms and formal rules to govern its operations and that the choice to apply either rules
or norms is "based on a calculation of [the] comparative efficiency" of each in
maximizing group welfare-much like more formal firms in the West); West, supra note
4, at 304 (finding that Japanese citizens often choose norm-based methods over formal
litigation in resolving noise pollution disputes based on calculations of cost).
186 Cf West, supra note 4, at 303-04 (finding that Japanese citizens often choose
norm-based methods over formal litigation in resolving noise pollution disputes based on
calculations of cost).
187 This a paraphrase of the general thrust of interviews.
188 For estimates of Hutong residents' annual incomes, see supra note 22.
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available to Hutong residents one afternoon each week, free of charge, in
order to publicize its legal reform efforts. 189 Residents were willing to meet
with lawyers under these circumstances, but when the program ended, so did
their contact with members of the legal profession. 190
Of course, there are other economic costs associated with formal
litigation that guided residents' preferences for norm-based solutions-
namely that litigation is a time-consuming and generally miserable process.
After citing the prohibitive monetary costs involved, most residents we
interviewed went on to explain that litigation demanded too much time and
was far too mafan ("annoying" or "aggravating") to be worthwhile. Why,
they asked, would they hire a lawyer, file documents in court, and initiate the
lengthy litigation process when they can walk five meters across the
courtyard and consult directly with their neighbors-who they will have to
see several times during the course of each day anyway-or, in the worst-
case scenario, call the Residents' Committee mediators, who will come
resolve things for free?191
Added to these direct costs of litigation is the more general difficulty
associated with learning the substantive content of legal codes. None of the
residents interviewed had any knowledge of China's formal legal codes-to
say nothing of access to formal legal training-and indeed many of the older
residents we interviewed were illiterate. The time and effort required to gain
a rudimentary understanding of the law is thus extremely high for Hutong
residents, even if they are relatively well educated. 192 In fact, our
interviewees' collective ignorance of formal law probably reflects larger
systemic realities of the Chinese developing legal environment. Several
scholars have recently identified public ignorance of the law as a pervasive
problem in China, even among lawyers, government officials, and political
elites. 193 This is perhaps not surprising, given the primacy of Communist
party politics and Maoist ideology-and hence the weakness of law-in
Chinese policy and administration since 1949. China's prodigious legal
reform efforts since 1979, while spectacular in their own right, certainly have
189 This was reported in one of our interviews.
190 Many interviewees referred to this program with enthusiasm and interest, though
very few said that it changed their view of lawyers or the law in any meaningful way.
191 This is a summary of a general consensus among interviewees.
192 In his study of Shasta County ranchers, Ellickson similarly found that formal law
is disfavored because it is difficult to learn and apply. See Ellickson, supra note 80, at
686.
193 See Randall Peerenboom, Ruling the Country in Accordance with Law:
Reflections on the Rule and Role of Law in Contemporary China, CULTURAL DYNAMICS,
Nov. 1999, at 315, 333.
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not erased the accumulated political practices and administrative modalities
of prior decades.
Yet, even for those who invest time in learning the laws of China, the
current Chinese legal environment remains complex and uncertain. As part of
its efforts to develop a more robust legal system, the National People's
Congress passed 328 laws and decisions, the State Council promulgated 770
administrative regulations, and local legislatures enacted more than 5,200
local regulations between 1979 and 1997.194 Beyond this are more than
24,000 "legal enactments" created by executive ministries under the national
State Council, 195 and the massive, Byzantine nature of China's new legal
code becomes apparent. As mentioned earlier, this general complexity and
opacity are particularly acute in laws concerning urban housing property
rights. 19
6
The difficulties that inhere in such volume and complexity are further
exacerbated by the way Chinese laws are typically drafted. Most new statutes
and regulations are set forth in intentionally broad, vague terms to allow the
Chinese government maximum flexibility in its application and enforcement
of official rules. 197 Laws also tend to be inconsistent, 198 and rules-or their
method of application-often change rapidly with minimal notice.199 One
Hutong resident joked that the Chinese government outlaws everything, and
then decides which laws it will actually enforce based on prevailing political
conditions and policy priorities: "This year it is an anti-domestic violence
campaign," remarked one resident.200 "Next year, maybe other things will be
more important."'201 The government constantly initiates new experimental
policy programs-complete with their own sets of rules and regulations-
that are later either broadened or discontinued as administrative needs
194 Cai Dingjian, Development of the Chinese Legal System Since 1979 and Its
Current Crisis and Transformation, CULTURAL DYNAMICS, July 1999, at 135, 136; see
also William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project
of Legal Construction, CULTURAL DYNAMICS, July 1999, at 193, 194 (corroborating these
figures).
195 Alford, supra note 194, at 194.
196 For a discussion of housing property rights, see supra Part II.
197 Peerenboom, supra note 193, at 336.
198 See PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 152 (1997) (finding that two-thirds of local laws in
Beijing, Hebei, and Tianjin are inconsistent with the Chinese National Constitution).
199 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
200 Id.
201 Id.
874
[Vol. 20:3 20051
BEIJING HUTONGS
demand. 20 2 Along these same lines, very little historical case law is available
to guide legal interpretations or enable accurate prediction as to how legal
authorities will interpret certain laws or handle certain types of legal
issues.20 3 Of course, these conditions impose great uncertainty on citizens
trying to ascertain the contours of their own legal rights and duties.
Yet perhaps the greatest problem in the Chinese legal system today lies
in the continued politicization of Chinese law. Despite all the aforementioned
reform efforts, the CCP still effectively controls the application of law in
Chinese courts. Chinese judges are still appointed by the Party; they often
consult with CCP officials on how to decide difficult cases, 204 and anywhere
from 25% to 40% of judicial rulings go unenforced for political reasons.205
Judges have not achieved independence from the CCP's political
superstructure, and, as such, litigation remains more a political than a legal
exercise. 206
Given all of these difficulties, it is no wonder that Hutong residents are
loathe to venture into the realm of formal law when handling local disputes.
The vast majority of residents do not know any of the law's Byzantine formal
content, and, even if they possessed such knowledge, they could not
accurately predict which rules actually would be applied to any given case.
Most residents thus see calling the police or engaging the court system as a
crapshoot: Complicated rules will be applied and some remedy will be
mandated, but one can never predict which rules will be used or how they
will be interpreted.
To precisely illustrate this point, one resident told a story-which had
apparently become local legend in his neighborhood-about a resident whose
pet dog was run over by a motorist. The motorist offered to pay the purchase
price of the animal, which was quite low, but refused to offer any additional
compensation. The irate dog owner summoned the Beijing police, only to be
heavily fined for improperly registering his (now deceased) dog with the city
authorities. The motorist was allowed to leave without paying anything. It
202 Peerenboom, supra note 193, at 337.
203 To the extent that it has modem legal institutions, the Chinese system is more
closely related to a civil law system, with minimal emphasis on common law
jurisprudence through an accretive case law.
204 Edward J. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC LAW
REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 41 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); Stanley Lubman, Bird in
a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 395-96
(2000).
205 Peerenboom, supra note 193, at 341.
206 Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, in CHINA's LEGAL
REFORMS 6 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., 1996).
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was actually the dog owner's own fault, our storyteller insisted, as everyone
knows that calling the police is generally a risky proposition. In a colloquial
sense, the dog owner had "assumed the risk" of any adverse consequences
when he involved the Beijing police in his dispute; he should have just
phoned the Residents' Committee mediators. 207
In fact, these deficiencies in the Chinese legal system may predate the
Communist era. Some scholars have posited that the historic inaccessibility
or inadequacy of the Chinese imperial court system contributed to the
widespread entrenchment of private mediation traditions in Chinese
society.20 8 Modem Hutong residents' response to these institutional
shortcomings should not be surprising. Prior scholarship has demonstrated
that the structure of legal regimes matters in determining how legal rules will
be applied and enforced in practice.20 9 Individuals will predictably eschew
rules and enforcement mechanisms that are ill-suited to their personal
circumstances.2 10 Other scholars focusing on Asia generally have noted that
the informal, norm-based practices of private "middlemen groups" have
traditionally figured prominently in Asian commerce, especially in areas
where legal institutions are deficient and legal entitlements are not reliably
enforced.211
Clearly, resorting to formal legal proceedings requires money, time,
effort, and exposure to high levels of uncertainty for Hutong residents. Yet
there is another less prototypical "cost" associated with formalized legal rule
enforcement that may be at least as important in creating preferences for
207 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
208 See, e.g., Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., "Court-Performed" Mediation in the
People's Republic of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal
District Courts' Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 391, 397-98
(2000); Justice Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REv. 383,
386-87 (1987).
209 Barbara E. Koh, Alterations Needed: A Study of the Disjunction Between the
Legal Scheme and Chinatown Garment Workers, 36 STAN. L. REV. 825, 854 (1984)
(finding that garment workers in San Francisco's Chinatown do not benefit from their
formal legal rights because they are generally socially isolated and unaware of such
rights, and because legal remedies and enforcement mechanisms clash with the social
realities of their employment conditions).
2101Id.
211 Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 15, 21 (1984).
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norm-based solutions: social costs. 2 12 Initiating lawsuits or calling the police
are seen as extremely hostile, anti-social acts among Hutong residents. 2 13 No
matter how compelling one's claim against a neighbor, in the eyes of the
community, summoning public authorities implies a distrust of the
neighborhood social network and the private solutions it is able to deliver.
Since residents live in such close proximity, the inconvenience and stress
associated with government intervention are generally shared to some
degree, especially among neighbors who share a common courtyard space.
As mentioned earlier, all of our 65 interviewees expressed an aversion to
lawsuits or police intervention in general, and many made a point of saying
that they would never want to create such a neighborhood-level disturbance
unilaterally. This attitude echoes the old Chinese adage recited by one elderly
interviewee: "It is better to starve to death than become a thief. It is better to
be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit.
' 2 14
There was also general agreement among residents that initiating legal
proceedings or calling the police constitutes a public expression of contempt
for the opposing party and his or her reputation. Such an affront is likely to
effectively terminate any ongoing social relationship and guarantee the
complainant a lifelong enemy, whatever the outcome of the lawsuit or
intervention. Again, in light of the close physical proximity of most Hutong
households, and the high frequency of interaction between neighbors, it is
extremely problematic to make enemies of nearby residents. 2 15 As Ellickson
found in his study of Shasta County ranchers, most neighborly disputes
represent mere "minor irritations between parties who typically have
complex continuing relationships." 2 16 These ongoing relationships enable
residents to enforce their own norm-based regimes informally 2 17 and are
threatened by recourse to formal litigation. Enter another proverb (also
212 Cf. West, supra note 4, at 304 (finding that "social factors" often drive Japanese
citizens to employ institutionalized norm-based mechanisms rather than formal litigation
when resolving Karaoke noise disputes).
213 Cf. Ellickson, supra note 80, at 681 (finding that ranchers in Shasta County,
California view filing a lawsuit as a hostile social act).
214 This was reported in one of our interviews.
215 For detail on the exigencies of informal sanctions and reprisals between
neighbors, see our discussion of enforcement mechanisms in Hutong communities infra
Part VII.
216 Ellickson, supra note 80, at 628.
217 Id.; see also infra Part VII (discussing norm-based resolutions in Hutongs).
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referenced in one of our interviews): "It is better to keep a friend than to win
a litigation." 218
While most of us can readily imagine the adverse social effects of
litigation in a small community, theoretical approaches can help place such
phenomena more squarely within a generalized cost-benefit calculus.
Specifically, Robert Putnam's concept of social capital-"features of social
organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination
and cooperation for mutual benefit"-may be informative. 219 Given the close
physical proximity of households and the frequent interactions between
neighbors, it may be fairly said that Hutong communities produce, and in
turn depend on, large amounts of social capital. In particular, "bonding"
social capital (Putnam's "sociological superglue"), which creates bonds
among members of discrete groups and "is good for undergirding specific
reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity, ' 220 is of great value to most Hutong
residents. As Putnam elucidates, this value is not simply emotive: "Social
norms and the networks that enforce them" help communities overcome
collective action problems, reduce the uncertainty and transactions costs
associated with interactions between strangers, facilitate information
exchange, and make for more public-regarding citizens. 221
Such benefits are of particular importance in communities, like Hutongs,
where residents must interact frequently and often depend on one another in
performing the basic tasks of everyday life. Hutong residents generally must
share common courtyard bathrooms, obtain water from common courtyard
taps, and share basic household implements, such as tools, gardening
equipment, and large cooking appliances. Kitchen facilities tend to be located
in common courtyard space (for ventilation reasons), and all families share
responsibility for keeping common areas clean. Responsibility for collection
of water, electricity, maintenance, and sanitation payments typically rotates
among the households in a given courtyard, with a new family assuming
collection duty every one to six months. Similarly, child rearing and care for
218 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra
note 35.
219 For Putnam's explanation of this influential concept, see ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 21-24, 65-67
(2000).
220 Id. at 23.
221 Id. at 288-89.
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the elderly are often largely communal activities, shared by groups of
households as their needs and abilities dictate.222
Given these extensive interdependencies, fear of litigation's social
consequences reflects not just an emotional aversion to unpleasant
interpersonal relations, but rather a subtle understanding of the community's
social fabric and its exigencies. By creating discord, distrust, and enmity,
recourse to formal legal channels depletes the pool of social capital on which
the whole community depends. Private negotiation or informal mediation, on
the other hand, is more conducive to individual engagement, relationship-
building, and maintenance of shared community values 223-in other words,
they are conducive to the creation and preservation of social capital. To the
extent that social capital is tied to the economic prosperity of communities,
as Putnam contends,224 destruction of social capital may be considered a
"cost" of law-based dispute resolution in the traditional economic sense.
Once the centrality of solid social networks to Hutong communities is
recognized, the social disruption associated with litigation or other law-based
solutions can be considered a legitimate component of residents' cost-benefit
calculus, even if it remains completely non-monetized. 225
One additional factor that deserves mention is cultural tradition. While
purely cultural explanations of dispute resolution phenomena are generally
too vague and deterministic to be satisfying, it is nonetheless clear that "the
way societies handle disputes is culturally constructed" to some degree.226
Here, it is sufficient merely to note that voluntary mediation mechanisms
222 For a more complete discussion of Hutong living conditions, see supra Part II.B
(discussing Hutongs as residential environments).
223 Colatrella, supra note 208, at 392-93; see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, "hat Do
We Need a Mediator For?: Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 27 (1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871,
1872 (1997). Mediation in particular has been found to foster individual "empowerment"
and enhanced "recognition" (or empathy for other parties)-qualities which would seem
naturally conducive to the formation of social capital. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 84-95 (1994).
224 PUTNAM, supra note 219, at 319-25.
225 Mark West has also found that decisions to eschew formal legal dispute
resolution mechanisms in favor of less formal norm-based mechanisms are often driven
by efforts to preserve social capital. See West, supra note 4, at 304.
226 Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The
Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 709, 731 (1988).
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have historically been an integral part of China's formal legal system. 2 27 In
the words of one scholar, the "Chinese legal system has been one of the
world's most committed institutions in the use of mediation to resolve
disputes and a leader in developing ways to maximize its benefits and
effectiveness. '228 In fact, prior studies have found that more than half of all
civil and economic matters filed in Chinese courts are resolved through
mediation rather than formal adjudication. 229 In this sense, Chinese citizens
may not view Residents' Committee mediations as "extralegal" at all.
Despite a lack of set procedures or written rules, such mediations are in line
with longstanding practices of the formal Chinese legal system-the rule-
focused and proceduralist biases of Western observers notwithstanding.
Thus, historical practice and distinct cultural understandings of law and
legalism probably also play some role in leading Hutong residents to prefer
private mediation over formal litigation. 230
Our findings dovetail with the general proposition that, in any legal
jurisdiction, legal institutions must be mindful of the transactions costs they
impose on citizens, since people will resort to private solutions if the costs of
using public law are too high.23' Indeed, in his groundbreaking study of
cattle trespass disputes in Shasta County, Robert Ellickson found that formal
law does not affect individual entitlements precisely because the transaction
costs of using formal law are too high in most cases-that is, it is usually too
difficult to learn and enforce legal rules through formal institutional
channels. 232
With regard to the general cost and flexibility advantages of mediation
over more formal legal proceedings, our findings are also fully consistent
227 See Colatrella, supra note 208, at 394.
228 Id. at 395.
229 See Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the
People's Republic of China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 128 (1996) (noting that
61.5% of all civil and economic matters filed in Chinese courts in 1986 were ultimately
resolved through court-performed mediation).
230 For elaboration, see discussion of the historical roots of mediation and the
Residents' Committee supra Part IV.B.
231 See UGO MATEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 56 (2000).
232 Ellickson, supra note 80, at 628-29, 686. In fact, Ellickson discovered that
neither the residents of Shasta County nor their insurance adjusters heeded legal
distinctions in settling trespass claims. Id. at 685-86.
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with the relevant alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature.233 The
impetus for many ADR programs often lies in the lower time and money
costs of mediation compared with litigation, as well as the greater degree to
which mediated outcomes can be tailored to the unique exigencies of
individual disputes or the preferences of specific disputants. 234 Scholars
focusing on China specifically have expounded on the enduring appeal of
"court performed" mediation as a "flexible process that is tailorable to a
variety of disputes." 235
Hutong residents' aversion to formal law thus becomes fully
comprehensible, once the relative costliness of legal solutions-along both
monetary and social dimensions-is considered. Formal law is generally
eschewed primarily because it requires too much time, money, and
uncertainty, and it damages vital social relationships.
B. Where Social Ties End.: The Domain of Formal Rules (and Law) in
Hutong Life
All of this is not to say that formal law is never used in Hutong residents'
dispute resolution. Under circumstances where disputes are extremely
serious, the injuries or losses involved are catastrophic, or where incentives
to preserve ongoing social relationships no longer exist, formal law may be
used to resolve conflicts. Specifically, interviewees consistently reported that
recourse to formal legal channels is more likely in cases involving physical
fights, serious injuries, large-scale property destruction, and divorce or final
division of household property.236 In many of these cases, residents' use of
formal law may simply reflect the fact that the traditional economic costs of
doing so are overcome by the injuries-or potential injuries-involved. If,
for example, a residence burns to the ground, a resident is severely injured in
an altercation, or all of one household's property must be divided, the time
and money costs of litigation may become justified in purely monetary terms.
233 See Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR Services?, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 65, 74 (1998); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-4 (1995).
234 Id.
235 Colatrella, supra note 208, at 392-93.
236 Residents consistently offered these four types of disputes, or subsets of them,
when asked the following open-ended question: "What kinds of disputes require recourse
to formal law?" Physical altercations appeared to be the prototypical example, as 27 of 35
residents in one interview set (over 77%) mentioned this category specifically.
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On a more fundamental level, all of these more serious dispute categories
also represent "end game" situations-situations where preexisting
relationships, and the associated promise of iterated future interactions, are
either destroyed or significantly devalued. Lisa Bernstein and others have
noted the significance of end-game situations in dispute resolution: While
informal norms and the exigencies of ongoing relationships may be the most
efficient drivers of dispute resolution at mid-game, formal rules and
institutions are often needed to resolve disputes when relationships-and
associated incentives to preserve community norms and find mutually
acceptable solutions-end.237 Accordingly, several studies have found that
litigation generally occurs between strangers or where existing relationships
have already "ruptured. '238 Indeed, in many cases the litigation itself acts to
end preexisting relationships.239 Divorce is one paradigmatic example of this,
as a prior marital relationship is formally terminated. Indeed, residents report
that, as more robust legal institutions have developed in recent years,
divorcing couples have increasingly sought professional legal advice about
property division and custody issues.240
Of course, termination of ongoing relationships need not be formalized.
In cases of physical fights or serious injuries, for example, the enmity and ill-
will naturally generated by such events may effectively end the parties'
interest in a continuing social relationship. Our interviews revealed that
residents almost universally call the police when serious physical altercations
erupt.241 In some cases, the police may be called by a concerned neighbor
who, while not directly involved in the fight, fears the impact of violence on
the social milieu of the neighborhood (or courtyard) in general. Still, even in
cases of physical violence or serious injuries, informal mediation can prove
relevant. In one interesting case, a motorist accidentally ran into a small
shack in a Hutong alleyway, which fell onto an elderly woman sitting nearby,
seriously injuring her.242 Though the woman's family initially sought to sue
237 See Bernstein, supra note 182, at 1766-71 (discussing norms versus institutions
in the context of merchant law).
238 See id.; Ellickson, supra note 80, at 672-78; Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 24-25 (1983).
239 See Galanter, supra note 238, at 24-25.
24 0 Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood (June 30,
2002) (notes on file with authors); Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong
neighborhood, supra note 129.
241 See supra note 236 (comments by residents on the use of law enforcement in the
context of physical altercations).
242 Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note
240. The woman's family called the police and consulted with the relevant legal
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the motorist for damages, the parties eventually agreed on a private
resolution, mediated by the police and representatives from the Residents'
Committee, which actually contravened the relevant Chinese law by
excluding the motorist's work unit ("danwei) from the negotiations and the
payment of damages. 243
There is one other area of Hutong life where formal rules tend to hold
sway, and it too is an area where social relationships between residents lose
much of their importance: the provision of utilities and other public goods.
Maintenance and repair of public property at the alleyway level (such as
street lights), garbage collection, and the provision of water and electricity
are all governed by formal legal rules or fixed government policies.244 In
many cases, this is simply driven by formidable collective action problems
and resource availability. Collection of waste, operation of a water-supply
system, and maintenance of a large-scale electrical grid are most efficiently
handled by government public works projects in China as in most societies.
Individual neighborhoods simply do not have the means to serve these
functions efficiently by themselves.
Yet even here, social relationships and community norms can be relevant
where technology, or lack thereof, demands. For example, each Hutong
household has its own electricity meter, so electricity bills are easy to
calculate according to standard government-set rates for power usage.245
Hutong households generally do not have individual water meters; typically,
authorities, fully intending to bring a lawsuit to recover damages. However, after
repeated meetings with the motorist at the hospital where the woman was being treated,
the woman's family agreed to reach a private agreement with the motorist instead of
resorting to formal court proceedings. The motorist agreed to pay all the woman's
hospital bills and the subsequent costs of medication and ongoing medical care. He also
agreed to pay the woman's family for their lost wages due to time spent at the hospital
and for emotional suffering. The motorist, the local police, the victim's family, and a
community representative from the Residents' Committee met several times throughout
this process to agree on the amount of the damage payments. These elaborate
negotiations were conducted completely outside the formal legal system, despite the
presence of police officers in the negotiations. In fact, according to the police officers
involved, formal Chinese law would have required the motorist's work unit ("danwe"') to
be involved in making damage payments, but the parties' private negotiations bypassed
this requirement altogether. Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.; Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note
22.
245 Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note
240; Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
883
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
each courtyard has one communal water source with its own central meter.246
Thus, the households of each courtyard are charged collectively for monthly
water use, and they are left to their own devices to divide these costs among
households.247 An informal norm has arisen whereby courtyard water bills
are divided by the number of people in the courtyard with each household
contributing money according to the number of its members. 248 In other
words, while technological advancements have insulated payment of
electrical bills from the contingencies of social relationships, a lack of similar
technology in water provision ensures the continued relevance of community
networks and social norms.
Of course, this is in line with our more general findings concerning the
role of formal rules at endgame: Technology has effectively rendered all
ongoing social relationships irrelevant to payment of electricity costs. By
contrast, allocation of water costs is a highly social exercise, and disputes
have predictably arisen over certain households' alleged "stealing" of water
from their neighbors. 249 According to our interviews, most of these disputes
concern the classification of infants or small children as "members" of
households for cost allocation purposes, or the duty of households to pay
extra for guests who stay with them for extended periods of time.250 The
residents' committee members we interviewed reported handling water
disputes on a regular basis, adhering to the per capita allocation norm where
feasible.
Clearly, the meter-based allocation of electricity costs is more
straightforward and definitive than the per capita calculus used for water
bills. While heightened legal formality and greater clarity coincide in this
case, it is the metering technology, not the formal rules per se, that creates
this certainty. As China's economy further develops and modernizes in the
future, technological advancements will certainly have their effects, perhaps
removing other areas of Hutong life from the social domain and allowing for
the use of more truly "mechanized" rules. Whether this contingency is
normatively desirable or not is a question worth considering, though
ultimately beyond the scope of this paper.
246 See supra note 245.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note
240. Such issues were also reported for electricity costs where individual household
meters were broken or costs were tracked by both household and communal meters
(which often registered different totals). Id.
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In sum, Hutong residents employ formal rules primarily where the stakes
are large or where the relevance of their social relationships end, whether by
dint of socially catastrophic disputes, the formal termination of habitation or
familial relationships, or the exigencies of new technology.
C. Predictability, Best Practices, and Socially Constructive "Voice ":
The Advantages of Mediated Solutions
Our research thus clearly confirms the primacy of informal norms in
dispute resolution among members of a cohesive community. Hutong
communities are paradigmatic examples of Robert Ellickson's "close-knit"
group: "a social network whose members have credible and reciprocal
prospects for the application of power against one another and a good supply
of information on past and present internal events. ''251 And, as in the close-
knit groups examined by Ellickson and others in the literature, norms-rather
than formal law-tend to dominate dispute resolution systems. Additionally,
while confirming the cost advantages and flexibility associated with norm-
based solutions in general, and mediation in particular, our field research also
suggests that, especially in the context of a developing legal system, norm-
based mediation may offer disputants greater certainty, clarity, and
predictability than either formal legal solutions or private norm-based
bargaining between neighbors.
Prior scholarship has tended to contrast the different comparative
advantages of bright-line rules and broad general principles within legal
systems. 252 In China, it is formal law that is unpredictable and "muddy," due
chiefly to its highly politicized method of application and its general lack of
precision or standardization. 253 Conversely, since the social principles that
govern Residents' Committee mediations are widely shared within Hutong
communities, residents testified that such mediations in fact offer substantial
levels of clarity and predictability. Universal norms against fighting,
disruptive uses of courtyard space, damaging the property of others without
offering compensation, free-riding on the common water supply, and
demanding payment from the destitute narrow the range of socially
legitimate resolutions to any given dispute, thereby providing Hutong
mediations with some of the predictability normally associated with bright-
line rules, while simultaneously preserving the essential flexibility of
251 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
252 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577-
90 (1988).
253 See supra Part VI.A (discussing the Chinese legal regime).
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principle-based systems. As one scholar noted, when disputes arise in small
communities "norms allocate risks and specify means of resolution," 254 and
this may provide at least as much predictability and clarity as the provisions
of an institutionally deficient legal system.
This clarity is enhanced where norm-based mediations are performed by
known members of the Residents' Committee according to reasonably
standardized, if still informal, procedures. Residents generally are familiar
with their Residents' Committee representatives (indeed they voted them into
office), and the outcomes of past mediations often provide some guidance as
to how future disputes may be handled. Unlike one-off private negotiations
between parties, more centralized mediating authorities are able to aggregate
and disseminate-formally or informally-information about mediation
outcomes and standardize practices over time. In this way, the activities of
non-legalistic public authorities, while not based on any codified rules, may
provide residents with a kind of norm-based folk case law system. Residents
often are able to predict future outcomes with some level of certainty based
simply on the identity of the mediator involved and information about
outcomes of past disputes. 255
Beyond providing enhanced predictability and clarity, mediation through
non-legalistic public authorities may provide the additional advantage of
mitigating the costs associated with private negotiations in situations of
bilateral monopoly. Several theorists have demonstrated that negotiations
within bilateral monopolies-situations where two parties each have
unilateral power to preclude resolution of a given dispute-tend to be costly,
as individuals have incentives to be strategic and non-conciliatory. 256
Intervention by non-legalistic public authorities like the Residents'
254 Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 155 (1996) ("When members of a
solitary group transact, norms and non legal sanctions generally resolve disputes. When
contingencies arise, norms allocate risks and specify means of resolution. Norms also
prohibit bad faith and opportunism. The importance of maintaining a good reputation and
of avoiding ostracism deters improper behavior.").
255 Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note
240.
256 See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 243 (1982) ("[P]eople will exercise
their worst threats against each other unless there is a third party to coerce both of
them."); William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91
(1978) ("[T]ransaction costs under bilateral monopoly are high."); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 45 (2d ed. 1977).
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Committee may serve to soften these difficulties, and community interests
are introduced to temper the private strategic interests of the individual
parties.
Albert Hirschman has famously posited that individuals generally resort
to "exit" (removing oneself from the situation entirely) or "voice" (making
one's grievance known) when faced with an unacceptable situation. 257 In the
context of a Hutong residential environment, most disputants cannot simply
"exit" the community or escape interactions with their neighbors-the
Beijing housing market is tightly regulated, most residents do not have
enough money to purchase property elsewhere, and the threat of impending
government demolition of Hutong areas generally makes Hutong residences
hard to sell.258 Under these circumstances, exercise of "voice" is often the
sole option available to disgruntled residents, and as such it must be carefully
managed and channeled into socially constructive modes. Again, as
unofficial stewards of the community interest, Residents' Committee
mediators are well positioned to exercise "voice." Resort to third-party
mediation often avoids the destructive escalation of disputes through
individual reprisals or, in the extreme, vigilantism, and ensures that resident
"voice" will be exercised in a socially constructive manner. In fact, several
residents we interviewed reported that individuals often call for Residents'
Committee intervention precisely because they do not want to deal solely
with the opposing party in discussing a grievance.259 Rather than confronting
one's neighbors in a socially awkward bilateral confrontation, third-party
mediation often promised more productive and less socially painful
outcomes.
Finally, to the extent that "social capital... underwrites the successful
enforcement of formal state policy,"260 as some have suggested, use of norm-
based dispute resolution mechanisms, where feasible, may actually augment
the effectiveness of formal legal regimes by bolstering the social cohesion
necessary for the effective functioning of any legal system. Indeed, Robert
Cooter has postulated that formal laws are most needed in cases of norm
257 ALBERT O. HiRSCiMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970).
258 See supra Parts ILA, II.C (discussing recent Chinese government policies and
their implications for the future of Hutong neighborhoods).
259 One example of the phenomenon is the pigeon defecation dispute, where the
complainants first consulted the Residents' Committee because they were uncomfortable
confronting their neighbor directly about the problem. See supra Part V.
260 Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2055, 2076 (1996).
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"market" failure.26' Where organic social processes create dysfunctional or
inefficient social practices, formal law can serve a corrective function by
enforcing a more efficient norm or creating new, socially useful legal
obligations. 262 Where organic social norms are functioning well, however,
government imposition of formal legal rules may be unnecessary or, at worst,
damaging to the social fabric of the community. 263
Of course, private negotiations between residents can adequately serve to
reinforce social norms, but there is always a danger that private parties will
implement dysfunctional or socially destructive norms. Specifically, parties
may make arrangements that impose serious externalities on other members
of the community. 264 Resort to third-party mediation is certainly not a fail-
safe solution to this dilemma, but, as specialized mediators typically
intervene in numerous disputes over time, they can aggregate information
and identify best practices, much as common law judges might. In this
capacity, they can reduce the "inevitable tension between dispute resolution's
private function and its public function."265 Non-legalistic public authorities
thus not only reinforce the vitality of social norms writ large, their special
role as repeat mediation players positions them to (ideally) reinforce the right
norms-those that will ultimately contribute to a healthy legal system more
generally. 266
By way of summary, the close physical proximity of Hutong neighbors
and the myriad of social ties that typically bind them, combined with a
desirable lack of formalized procedure, make private neighbor-to-neighbor
bargaining an extremely cheap dispute resolution method. There are no
lawyer's fees to pay, no time spent in court, and transaction costs tend to be
very low, as it is logistically easy to find the other party in question, conduct
261 Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 947,
948-49 (1997).
262 Id.
263 See Pildes, supra note 260, at 2057, 2077; see also supra Part VIII (discussing
the implications of our findings for broader Chinese legal reform efforts).
264 See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that organic social norms may
create benefits for a given community at the expense of other groups).
265 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 223, at 1873 (discussing the inevitable tensions
that can arise).
266 W. Bradley Wendel has noted that "there is no guarantee in the concept of a
community that the community's norms will be those that ethically ought to be endorsed.
Unless informal social norms are kept in check by extra-community criticism, nothing
prevents the community's values from moving toward vice instead of virtue." W. Bradley
Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional
Communities, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1955, 1968 (2001).
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negotiations, and monitor compliance with an agreed-upon solution.267 As
such, this most informal first-tier method was the one most commonly used
by the residents interviewed, and was associated with simple high-frequency,
low-severity disputes that do not fundamentally threaten ongoing social
relationships or implicate the interests of the community.268
As might be expected, more formal mediation by a Neighborhood Police
officer or a Residents' Committee mediator269 involves significantly higher
transaction costs for the parties than informal negotiation. Furthermore,
resort to these "second-tier" options necessarily connotes a level of enmity
and social discord not present in informal neighbor-to-neighbor negotiations.
Intervention by the Residents' Committee and the Neighborhood Police are
thus associated with less frequent disputes that are too serious for neighbor-
to-neighbor resolution but do not threaten the fundamental social fabric of
the community. In second-tier situations, neighborly relations are tense but
salvageable, and a neutral mediator acting as the "voice of the community"
can play a useful role in defining individual entitlements and affirming
common values.270
Resort to formal third-tier legal channels-official legal institutions like
the police and the courts-typically is reserved for extremely serious or
intractable disputes that involve extremely large stakes, terminate ongoing
267 Predictably, the high costs of conducting negotiations in situations of bilateral
monopoly can be a factor here. See supra Part VI (discussion of cost-benefit analysis
involved in choosing a dispute resolution method).
268 Minor property damage and mildly annoying use of common courtyard space
(such as playing loud music or cluttering common areas) are prototypical examples. All
of the more than 60 residents interviewed reported using informal negotiations as a
default first option in all but the most serious, intractable disputes. In the final analysis, it
is almost always socially easier and economically cheaper to approach neighbors
individually and discuss a grievance privately. Id. (discussing residents' cost-benefit
calculus in choosing dispute resolution methods).
269 There is an extensive literature on the importance of third-party mediators and
the tradeoffs between using truly disinterested "neutrals" versus "experts" familiar with
the social, professional, or institutional context of the dispute. See Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 223, at 1882-84.
270 The disputes brought to the Residents' Committee were myriad and varied,
including significant property damage, prolonged and unusually obnoxious use of
common space, disputes over the allocation of water costs (which are assessed separately
for each courtyard), or disputes over debts or minor damage payments. See, e.g., supra
text accompanying notes 91-92.
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relationships, threaten the basic social fabric of the community and implicate
important public interests. 271
VII. MAKING MEDIATED SOLUTIONS STICK: REPRISALS, STATUS,
SHAME, GIFTS, AND OTHER INFORMAL SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
Of course, no dispute resolution regime is of much use if it generates
solutions that are difficult to enforce or commonly disregarded by disputants.
Accordingly, the enforcement imperative was a recurring topic in our field
research interviews. As mentioned earlier, the Hutong Residents'
Committees have no formal powers of coercion; they cannot impose fines or
formal penalties of any kind on residents.272 While the Residents' Committee
could summon the municipal police-or some other public actor-to
preserve public order in a particularly extreme case, so too could the average
Hutong resident. And, in any event, the Beijing police are not in the business
of enforcing resolutions mediated by local Residents' Committees. But what
is striking is how seldom recourse to state power is actually used once the
Residents' Committee decides to mediate a dispute. Of our 65 research
interviews with residents, only five (8.125%) reported incidents of a
Residents' Committee failure to affect a viable resolution once mediation
was initiated.273 Aside from the types of cases normally handled through
formal legal channels-incidents of serious physical violence, dissolution of
households and final division of property274-Residents' Committee
mediation appears to be extremely effective in resolving disputes, and the
mediated solutions tend to stick.
In the absence of any formal coercive power, Residents' Committees'
ability to enforce mediated resolutions rests entirely on (1) their moral
authority as articulators of community values and stewards of the community
interest, and (2) their ability to mobilize, implicitly or explicitly, private
271 Examples from our field research include large-scale property destruction,
division of property upon divorce, or physical confrontations involving serious injuries.
272 See supra Part II (discussing Residents' Committees).
273 These cases involved either intra-family disputes (three) or physical altercations
(two). This does not include disputes where mediations were ongoing at the time of the
interview. Residents seemed to have a good sense of their Residents' Committee's
mediation capacity, as most of them reported that for extremely serious disputes (e.g.,
serious injuries or physical violence), they would bypass the Committee and call the
police immediately. This could partially account for the Committees' high success rate.
274 See supra Part VI (discussing when Hutong residents typically invoke formal
legal channels).
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residents to enforce mediated resolutions through informal social
sanctioning. Scholars have discovered that, as a general matter, "informal" or
"second-order" social sanctions (like public shaming) can powerfully shape
individual incentives and facilitate the enforcement of shared social
norms.275 This is especially so in Ellickson's "close-knit" groups mentioned
earlier.276 In communities with strong, extensive intra-group social bonds,
members have a greater ability to monitor the implementation of norm-based
dispute resolutions and more points of contact at which to apply social
sanctions against intransigents. Ellickson's insight dovetails with Putnam's
construct of "bonding social capital," the "sociological superglue" that binds
tight-knit communities together, "undergirding specific reciprocity and
mobilizing solidarity" through complex webs of social relationships.277
Such conditions are certainly present in Hutong communities generally,
and they apply in spades to the small mini-communities of households that
share common courtyard space-these are "close-knit" groups par
excellence. Hutong residents, living in such close proximity to one another,
typically have-indeed typically cannot avoid-extensive daily contact with
neighbors that puts them in positions of mutual dependence, allows the
gathering of extensive information on their neighbors' lives and enables the
reciprocal application of both social rewards and punishments. Thus, in
enforcing norm-based resolutions against intransigent neighbors, residents
have a diverse arsenal of social ordinance at their disposal. The most basic
means of norm-enforcement are private self-help measures, though often
these are organized into coordinated group enforcement efforts.
Basic physical reprisals against neighbors are common, though this is
rarely done through direct violence and is often symbolic or designed to
impose practical difficulties on offending individuals. Examples include
secretly removing bricks necessary to build unacceptable structures in
common courtyard space, 278 moving pet excrement from common courtyard
areas to the pet owner's doorstep, 279 responding to a neighbor's noisy
activities by making intrusive noise,280 and throwing dirty kitchen water at an
275 See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603, 1603-04 (2000).
276 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
277 PUTNAM, supra note 219, at 22-24.
278 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
129.
279 Id.
280 Interview with Resident Group, Jianguomen Wai Hutong neighborhood, supra
note 35.
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offending neighbor's kitchen facilities.281 We even heard reports of semi-
violent reprisals against neighbors, such as applying a timely slap to a
neighbor's head, but this method seemed the exception rather than the rule,
apparently used primarily by senior members of the community against
younger neighbors.282
These kinds of direct private reprisals are hardly unprecedented in
dispute resolution literature. In his landmark study of ranching communities
in Shasta County, California, Robert Ellickson observed that ranchers often
enforced informal cattle trespass norms through direct physical reprisals
against trespassing cattle, including "herding the offending animals to a
location extremely inconvenient for their owner" or, in extreme cases,
shooting them.283 In a similar vein, research by James M. Acheson has
revealed that lobster fisherman in Maine enforce common resource
management norms by destroying the traps of fishermen who stray into the
recognized fishing areas of others.284 These kinds of physical reprisals
primarily aim to impose economic costs on norm violators-costs associated
with retrieving, repairing, or replacing personal assets. In this respect, the
direct physical reprisals employed by Hutong residents perform a similar
function. They increase the economic costs-reckoned in time, money or
material--of daily life. The owner of an offending pet must clean up the
excrement placed at his doorstep, the would-be builder of an offending
structure must replace stolen bricks or cut his losses, the proprietor of
noxious kitchen facilities must clean up the additional dirty water thrown
there by neighbors.
281 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
129.
282 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79. Acts
of physical violence seemed to be universally disfavored, primarily because of their
propensity to escalate into serious confrontations or family feuds causing serious injury
or necessitating police intervention. We heard a few accounts of neighbors fighting
physically, but usually even these disputes were ultimately resolved through private
mediation brokered by Residents' Committee members, even if the police were initially
summoned to stop the violence. Some of the more colorful examples of such
confrontations include an individual stabbing a neighbor in the thigh during a fight over
cigarettes, Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood (July 3,
2002) (notes on file with authors), and an elderly man hitting a female neighbor over the
head with an abacus after a dispute about coal price discounts, Interview with Resident
Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note 240. In both cases, the disputes
were resolved through intervention and mediation by other neighbors or Residents'
Committee members.
283 Ellickson, supra note 80, at 678-79.
284 JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49 (1988).
[Vol. 20:3 2005]
BEIJING HUTONGS
Yet, unlike the physical self-help measures employed by cattle ranchers
and lobster fishermen, physical reprisals among Hutong neighbors occur in a
densely populated social environment, and so they serve an additional
symbolic or shaming function. Other members of the community will
inevitably notice the application of direct physical reprisals against an
offending neighbor, even if they were unaware of the initial disagreement or
dispute. Thus, such reprisals can be understood as socially visible acts of
protest performed in the public eye. Such acts are designed not merely to
impose direct economic costs on offending neighbors, but to embarrass them,
shame them, or cause them to lose face before other members of the
community. This practice of making demonstrative gestures of social protest
in response to private grievances actually has a rich history in Chinese
culture, and it clearly both implicates and reinforces traditional Chinese
social imperatives of saving face and preserving the family reputation. In
times past, individuals who could not collect private debts from neighbors
would sometimes resort to starving themselves on their debtor's doorstep,
thus publicly protesting the injustice and bringing shame on the debtor's
household. Depositing pet excrement on a neighbor's welcome mat, while
certainly several orders of magnitude less extreme, can be seen essentially as
an act following from this same tradition.
The exigencies of shame, status, and social prestige are also directly
implicated by more purely social reprisals against norm violators. Like
members of almost all communities, Hutong neighbors make extensive use
of negative gossip to punish intransigent or troublesome residents. 285 This
kind of activity is greatly facilitated by the physically and socially intimate
nature of Hutong residential life.286 Neighbors typically possess great
amounts of information about each other's activities, and any particular piece
of negative gossip can reach most members of the community within a day
by word of mouth. Individuals interviewed in the course of the project
commonly reported that defying norm-based dispute resolutions was
dangerous, as it subjected one's reputation to the ravages of the rumor-
285 Prior studies have concluded that gossip is a fundamental human activity
common to all cultures, suggesting that love of gossip may be a universal human
predisposition. See Max Gluckman, Gossip and Scandal, 4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
307, 308 (1963). Ellickson, Merry, and others have also identified the important role of
negative gossip in community norm-enforcement regimes. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note
80, at 685; Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 271 (Donald Black ed., 1984).
286 For discussion of Hutongs as residential environments, see supra Part II.
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mill.2 87 Said one Residents' Committee representative: "In this kind of
neighborhood, nothing can escape the eyes of the community. ' 288 When we
inquired about residents' lack of privacy, one interviewee asked rhetorically:
"Who doesn't know what goes on in other households?" 289
Negative gossip not only creates internal stress, frustration, and shame; it
also often leads to practical or logistical difficulties, as necessary dealings
with neighbors can become difficult or be precluded altogether. Community
members often make coordinated efforts to combine negative gossip with
other purely social sanctions in order to create a more powerful and
comprehensive social punishment. One common method, colorfully
described as "liangzhe" (literally: putting someone out to cool, like a hot
food dish), involves collectively enforcing a community-wide social boycott
of the individual and his or her family.290 This community-imposed "silent
treatment" is apparently a common sanction for breaches of group norms or
Residents' Committee-mediated dispute resolutions. 291 Many residents
seemed genuinely surprised at our suggestion that individuals might defy
community norms in the absence of coercive state penalties. When asked to
explain what makes norm-based mediations enforceable, one resident simply
stated: "People don't want the whole neighborhood against them, so they
obey."292
Yet, in addition to creating unpleasant social consequences for offending
individuals, gossip can also serve as an informal way of "adjudicating"
disputes and "refin[ing] the content of norms to resolve specific
concerns."293 By gossiping among themselves and agreeing to impose certain
social penalties on others, community members can effectively reaftirm both
287 Almost all out interviewees reported a general lack of social privacy and
pervasive sharing of gossip among neighbors. Young people in particular lamented the
fact that their dating life was a constant subject of community interest and conversation.
288 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
289 Interview with Resident Group, Yabao Lu Hutong neighborhood, supra note
129.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
293 Richard H. McAdams, Groups, Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237, 2256 (1996). Some scholars have even asserted that the dynamics of social
gossip are not conceptually far removed from those of courtroom proceedings. See
Barbara Yngvesson, The Reasonable Man and the Unreasonable Gossip: On the
Flexibility of (Legal) Concepts and the Elasticity of (Legal) Time, in CROSS-
EXAMINATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MAX GLUCKMAN 133, 134 (P.H. Gulliver ed.,
1978).
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the substantive content of shared norms and their collective commitment to
them. Such activity is the very stuff of Putnam's "bonding social capital,"294
and it should come as no surprise that it is a fundamental element of the
Hutong social environment. The Residents' Committees, in applying
accepted community norms to neighborly disputes, can count on informal
individual or communal sanctioning to enforce their mediated resolutions. In
adhering to group norms, the Residents' Committees both ensure the
enforceability of their resolutions and reinforce communal commitment to
those norms. Private community members and Residents' Committees thus
exercise a kind of joint stewardship of group norms. The Residents'
Committee acts as the formal articulator and executor of norms as applied to
given disputes, and the members of the community refine and affirm those
norms through their own individual or collective efforts to enforce them-or
the mediated solutions they dictate.
Interestingly, the Residents' Committees have another semi-official role
in establishing the community social status hierarchy. Every year, the city's
several district governments give awards to model households ("wu hao
iating") based on the recommendations of neighborhood Residents'
Committees.295 Among the criteria for the award are being a "good
neighbor" ("hao linju") and not causing trouble in the community.296
Households receiving the award can clearly display their "model household"
status by placing an official "wu hao iating" plaque on their door, and they
also receive prizes from the district government, such as family-sized bottles
of shampoo or other household goods. 297 Conversely, failure to receive the
award can damage the family reputation and serve as another means of
informal social shaming, particularly in communities where a majority of
households receive the award.298 Admittedly some residents were somewhat
cynical about the award and the Residents' Committees' role in nominating
households, yet the award's function as a status marker is striking, as are its
explicit ties to community dispute resolution norms and institutions.
There is yet another overlay to the enforcement process, separate from
norm-based private sanctioning or self-help, that deserves mention: Hutong
294 See PUTNAM, supra note 219, at 22-24.
295 This was reported in one of our interviews.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. We were told that, in some areas, a vast majority of households receive the
award, creating a clear way to identify the few especially troublesome members of the
community. Id.
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residents' internalized sense of community and reciprocity.299 The average
Hutong residents' many ties to other members of the community-including
the Residents' Committee itself-create opportunities for mutual gift
exchange and the establishment of reciprocal obligations. 300 The community
at large, and the Residents' Committees specifically, often provide valuable
assistance to individual residents.301 Beyond mediating disputes, the
Residents' Committee will use its small discretionary budget to provide
funds for elderly residents without children, disabled individuals, the jobless,
and the indigent. 302 The Committees also help families in financial trouble by
bringing them food or household goods, organize social activities for the
community, and hold classes or meetings on issues of common concern. 30 3
Additionally, the close-knit, communal nature of Hutong living makes
residents dependent on each other in many areas of everyday life.304 One
resident remarked that, with everyone living in such close physical and social
proximity, everyday problems for individual residents are really seen as
communal problems; the community helps its members to get by, and so
members feel a reciprocal obligation to help others and respect community
norms.
305
The dynamics of these internalized responsibilities and obligations do
not depend on utopian notions of social harmony or public virtue. As Marcel
Mauss and others have observed, gift exchange and ideas of reciprocal
obligation are foundational to the ordering of human societies. 306 Along
similar lines, the exigencies of ongoing social relationships dictate that
consideration of the overall balance of interactions typically takes precedence
over the desire to gain advantage in any given transaction among members of
close-knit communities.307 Thus, parties will commonly temper their
attempts to prevail in individual disputes with efforts to preserve social
299 Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note
282.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Interview with Resident Group, Qianmen Hutong neighborhood (June 28, 2002)
(notes on file with authors).
304 Communal child rearing and collective care for the elderly are typical examples.
See supra Part II (discussing Hutongs as residential environments).
305 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
306 MARCELL MAUSS, THE GIFT 63-81 (1954).
307 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 256-57 (1975).
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harmony and an overall balance in social "accounts." 30 8 Once again, the
close-knit nature of Hutong communities makes these universal social forces
especially salient. Residents are hesitant to defy the community will, not only
due to pragmatic concerns about the economic and social costs of informal
sanctioning, but also simply because they feel indebted to the community and
thus obliged to uphold its basic norms. To the extent that Residents'
Committees are identified as the legitimate stewards of the community
will-and our research gives every reason to believe that they often are-this
sense of obligation will extend to Committee-mediated dispute resolutions as
well. 309 This sense of social obligation also helps mobilize community
members to impose informal sanctions on their neighbors when necessary. 3 10
Three deterrents-none of them rooted in formal legal sanctions or state
power-thus combine to uphold community norms and enforce Residents'
Committee-mediated dispute resolutions in Beijing Hutongs. First, direct
physical reprisals against offending individuals impose substantial economic
costs. Second, community social exclusion ("putting people out to cool"),
negative gossip, and the symbolic aspects of direct physical reprisals
(enabled by the dense social context within which self-help occurs), impose
public shame, status reduction, and other social costs on intransigents.
Finally, residents' own internalized sense of obligation to the community and
its norms both deter offenders from defying norm-based resolutions and lead
other community members to enforce norm-based dispute resolutions
through direct reprisals against offending neighbors.
In light of this layering of deterrents and incentives, it cannot be said that
Hutong residents' collective norm-enforcement behavior is simply a process
of rational efficiency maximization. Considerations of economic efficiency
certainly play an important role in the enforcement of norm-based dispute
resolutions, but the various elements of resident decisionmaking in this area
are somewhat difficult to parse. In fact, residents may be status or prestige
maximizers as much as wealth maximizers, and while wealth and prestige
often overlap and feed into one another, they can also create conflicting
308 Id.
309 Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note
282; Interview with Resident Group, Qianmen Hutong neighborhood, supra note 307;
Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
310 Clearly community social solidarity is crucial to the effective enforcement of
norm-based dispute resolutions in Hutong communities. Robert Cooter has asserted that
actual consensus, rather than mere majority, is the best foundation for social norms and
their associated enforcement systems. Consensus more closely approximates individual
consent and thus provides a more stable (and perhaps legitimate) foundation for norm-
based regimes. See Cooter, supra note 261, at 978-79.
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incentives. While a resident who wants to build a norm-violating structure in
common courtyard space may conclude that the economic benefits of such a
structure outweigh the economic costs, including the costs created by
neighborly reprisals, the prospect of public shame, or loss of social status
might still preclude construction.
Scholars examining several different cultural traditions have observed
that, in many social and cultural contexts, a desire to maximize social status
can trump considerations of material gain.311 Some scholars have
hypothesized that the very creation of social norms is essentially rooted in a
desire for social esteem and prestige.312 Even in the ostensibly money-driven
environment of the modem American workplace, it has been shown that
status among one's co-workers matters, individual efforts at status display
are common, and many important elements of worker compensation are
fundamentally non-pecuniary. 3 13 Of course, it is possible to argue that shifts
in social status create practical difficulties that are ultimately "monetized" in
the overall economic efficiency calculus, but it is not obvious that this is the
case. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of purely social, emotive, or normative
incentives that, while fundamentally unmonetized, would drive Hutong
resident behavior. As Mauss himself observed: "It is our good fortune that all
is not yet couched in terms of purchase and sale. Things have values which
311 Mauss notes that, in many societies,
great surpluses, even by European standards, are amassed; they are expended often
at pure loss with tremendous extravagance and without a trace of mercenariness
[sic] . Diverse economic activities-for example, the market-are impregnated
with ritual and myth; they retain a ceremonial character, obligatory and efficacious;
they have their own ritual and etiquette.
MAuss, supra note 306, at 69-70 (internal citations omitted). Studies of so-called "shame
cultures" from around the world reinforce this point. In such cultures, spanning Western
antiquity, pre-Columbian North America and much of East Asia, ostensibly
straightforward economic efficiency considerations often appear to be trumped by desires
for status or prestige, even to the point of individual financial ruin. To cite one well-
known example, in the potlatch ceremonies of Native American tribes in the U.S.
Northwest, tribal leaders compete for status by giving away wealth, often to the
exhaustion of all their household goods. In one recorded incident, a chieftan apparently
even gave his guests the roof-boards of his dwelling in order to avoid shame and social
stigma. In such social systems, wealth is not accumulated but given away or publicly
destroyed in an effort to enhance one's social status. For a comprehensive discussion of
the potlatch ceremony and its function in establishing individual social status, see H.G.
BARNETT, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE POTLATCH 44-49, 77-85, 112-22 (1968).
312 See McAdams, supra note 91, at 342-43.
313 See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HuMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
QUEST FOR STATUS 38, 82, 99-102, 146-53 (1985).
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are emotional as well as material; indeed in some cases the values are
entirely emotional. Our morality is not solely commercial. 314
Over 20 years ago, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser coined the
phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the law" to describe the impact of legal
provisions on private bargaining in divorce cases.315 In the Hutong
environment, and perhaps in intra-group disputes arising in any tight-knit
social community, the more apt characterization is bargaining in the shadow
of the community. The "community," broadly understood to encompass both
the individuals that make up the group and the various norms and
conventions that comprise group culture, forms the social backdrop before
which all inter-neighbor negotiations take place. In both its abstract and
corporeal elements, the community sets the normative baselines against
which alternative resolutions are evaluated, dictates the substantive content
of mediated resolutions (through community-elected non-legalistic public
authorities), and provides a means of effectively enforcing norm-based
resolutions of disputes. Residents do not only bargain in the shadow of
potential costly reprisals from neighbors, but also within a more general
system of internalized values, implied responsibilities, and status hierarchies
that the community inculcates in its members. The community will, as
expressed in shared social norms and traditions, is thus the lodestar of most
dispute resolution efforts, and Hutong residents will sooner disregard both
law and immediate economic considerations as they pursue their own
interests against intransigent neighbors.
VIII. A LOOK AHEAD: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL REFORM, URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The rapid economic, legal, and social changes now roiling Chinese
society have been examined and analyzed by countless authors from many
diverse fields. Government efforts at promoting the related goals of
economic development and legal reform have had an enormous impact on
Chinese life since the Reform and Opening era officially began in the early
1980s. Chinese society has also undergone enormous social change during
this period, some of it unanticipated and perhaps unwelcome. As has been
discussed, Hutong life is not immune to such general social trends, and its
899
314 MAUSS, supra note 306, at 63.
315 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
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dispute resolution regimes have reflected broader societal changes in certain
ways.316
Yet, all things considered, the basic methods of dispute resolution in
Beijing Hutongs have remained remarkably stable over the last several
decades. Many of our interviewees had lived in the same Hutong for more
than 40 years, and these community elders reported little change in the basic
institutions of dispute resolution and the community norms that animate
them.317 Naturally, Residents' Committees have become less politicized
since the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 318 technology has
made the allocation of common water and electricity costs less
contentious, 319  economic liberalization has required that Residents'
Committee members receive salaries,320 and urban development has led
many young residents to move out of old neighborhoods and into apartment
buildings after marriage. 32 1 Yet, while traditional solutions must be adjusted
to accommodate a rapidly evolving social environment, the basic features of
today's Hutong dispute resolution regime would be recognizable to a resident
from the 1950s (and perhaps from the turn of the century).
This is not to say that the Hutong dispute resolution regime is "good" or
"fundamental" in some categorical way, but merely that it has proven
durable. Some scholars have contended that social norms are internalized
only where "private incentives for signaling align with a local public
316 See supra Part IV (discussing Residents' Committees' historical development
and recent professionalization).
317 This sentiment was expressed by older members of the community in many of
our interviews. Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 81;
Interview with Resident Group, Qianmen Hutong neighborhood, supra note 303;
Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note 282.
318 See Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note
22.
319 As mentioned earlier, electricity costs are calculated according to mechanical
meters in each household and are thus straightforward. By contrast, water costs are paid
in one lump sum for each courtyard, with each family contributing money in proportion
to the number of its members. This system was explained explicitly in several interviews.
Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 81; Interview with
Resident Group, Qiannen Hutong neighborhood, supra note 303; Interview with
Resident Group, Liu Li Chaing Hutong neighborhood, supra note 240.
320 Interview with Residents' Committee, Jianguomen Wai District, supra note 22.
321 This phenomenon was also corroborated in several interviews, mostly by older
residents who lamented the trend and feared its implications for the future of the
community. Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 81;
Interview with Resident Group, Qianmen Hutong neighborhood, supra note 303;
Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note 282.
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good. ' 322 Under this view, time-tested community norms reflect the efficient
evolution of local social structures; the norms that emerge from long-
standing social practice are the "good" ones, and they should be upheld and
applied as such.323 Others have observed that the dynamics of established
social communities are not uniformly healthy, suggesting that group-specific
norms must be subject to constant reexamination. As Robert Putnam noted,
social capital, so central to norm-based social systems, "can be directed
toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of
capital. ' 324 Norms, in short, can be destructive as well as constructive. Their
mere existence should not be taken as proof of their value.
The dispute resolution regime examined here is certainly not immune
from the implications of this debate. While the traditional norm-based system
has certainly proven effective in maintaining a certain amount of social order
and community solidarity, it also has evolved largely in response to a corrupt
legal and political order. While surely existing largely outside that order, the
extent to which its underlying assumptions and practices have been molded
by a corrupt officialdom remains an open question. In response to a legal
system plagued by corruption, Hutong residents have built an extra-legal
(one might say anti-legal) dispute resolution regime where personal
relationships, informal gift exchange, and individual self-help-the very stuff
of corruption and patronage in more official contexts-are of central
importance. How will the durability of this system, and others like it, affect
government attempts to construct a more efficient, rationalized, rule-based
legal order? In legal institution-building, the barriers created by official
corruption may not lie merely in the policies and practices of government,
but in the pragmatic, norm-based, extralegal systems that rational people
establish to protect their own communities and provide for their own welfare
in the face of systemic inadequacies. This difficulty is exacerbated when
these norm-based local traditions are of long standing.
It is widely accepted that law itself can perform a powerful expressive
function, reinforcing certain norms and discouraging others.325 As such,
322 Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224 (1994); see also Robert D.
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1676 (1996).
323 See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 322, at 224.
324 PUTNAM, supra note 219, at 21-22.
325 Cass Sunstein has produced the most general and influential treatments of this
topic, examining the expressive impact of legal rules in undermining destructive social
norms such as smoking and unprotected sex. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 2035;
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current Chinese efforts at legal reform will undoubtedly have an impact on
Hutong social norms, but the ultimate implications of this fact are hard to
ascertain ex ante.326 Ideally, one would hope for an "alignment of law with
morality," 327 or a "coincidence between the legal prescription and
community opinion," 328 whereby the enforcement of laws and norms,
through both public and private channels, are complementary and mutually
reinforcing.
Yet, even if law is ultimately successful in influencing community
norms, the results can be destructive. Richard H. Pildes has noted what he
calls "law's norm-destroying capacity"--the ability of legal rules to
undermine social norms that are themselves instrumental to the effective
application of the law. 32 9 Pildes asserts that state action can destroy the social
capital that undergirds social norms by removing the "structural conditions"
for social capital formation (as when it destroys neighborhoods and organic
social networks through urban renewal programs), or by precluding
traditional social practices and "distinctions" (as when attempts to
"rationalize" legal practice preclude the operation of informal reciprocity
norms). 330 Additionally, even when government earnestly tries to incorporate
social norms into its legal institutions, associated enforcement mechanisms
often lose the flexibility and customization that made preexisting norm-based
systems viable. In other words, law is simply too blunt and rigid a tool to
enforce certain norms without damaging the social fabric of the
community.33'
These are all considerations that the Chinese government would do well
to ponder. Its recent efforts to institute comprehensive legal reforms and
pursue urban development projects (some of which involve Hutong
demolition) could be fraught with difficulty, both for the residential
communities affected and for the government's own modernization
programs. In the worst case, new laws contrary to long-standing social norms
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 945-46; see also McAdams, supra note 91, at 342-43 (noting
that law can expressively reinforce or undermine social norms).
326 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 907-08. "[G]overnment deserves to have, and in
any case inevitably does have, a large role in norm management. [N]orm management is
an important strategy for accomplishing the objectives of law, whatever those objectives
may be." Id.
327 Cooter, supra note 261, at 979.
328 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social Norms and the
Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1901, 1969 (2000).
329 Pildes, supra note 260, at 2057.
330 Id. at 2077.
331 Id.
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could foment a governance crisis for a regime whose authority and
legitimacy have been in flux since 1979.332 At the very least, new laws that
disregard established norms may destroy social capital, preclude the use of
more efficient informal dispute resolution mechanisms, and damage the
social makeup of Hutong communities.
Government demolition of Hutong neighborhoods and relocation of
residents to new apartment high-rises 333 could have similar effects,
destroying useful norm-based systems and socially alienating former
residents. All of our older interviewees expressed anxiety at the prospect of
being moved to a new location. In addition to the understandable sentimental
ties they had to their current homes, they also feared the absence of human
contact and the lack of a social support network they might face in high-rise
apartment buildings. Thinking on the most practical of levels, one resident
asserted that she did not want to have to use stairs or elevators at her
advanced age, and she wondered aloud about the isolation she might face:
"What if I am sick? What if I fall down? Who will know I am in trouble?
Who will help me?" 334 Others simply stated that they would miss their
neighbors, their interactions with local children and their weekly mah jong
games.335 These kinds of considerations may or may not be appropriate to
legal reform or urban policy decisions, but the social costs of urban
development, whether reckoned in terms of social capital or normative
principles, are real.336
As for the ultimate fate of the current Hutong dispute resolution regime,
the future course of Chinese legal reform and urban development policy will
have a crucial impact. To the extent that Chinese citizens become richer and
better educated in the years to come (which seems almost certain to occur),
some of the purely monetary incentives to use informal norms rather than
formal law will soften. If more and more Chinese can afford recourse to
332 Minxin Pei has recently asserted that the Chinese government is already
undergoing a "Governance Crisis," though he places the fundamental causes within the
Chinese political system and relations between central government authorities in Beijing
and regional administrative structures. See Minxin Pei, China's Governance Crisis,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 96.
333 See supra Part II (discussing the history of Hutongs and recent urban
development policies).
334 Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note
282.
335 Interview with Resident Group, Qianmen Hutong neighborhood, supra note 303.
336 See JACOBS, supra note 54, at 3-25 (discussing the most famous critique of
modem urban development programs and their adverse effects on city social
environments).
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formal legal channels, it is likely that they will make greater use of formal
law in their disputes. Similarly, to the extent that ongoing Chinese legal
reform programs can deliver clear, coherent, and normatively acceptable new
laws-and, perhaps most crucially, to the extent that the government can
control official corruption and ensure the faithful enforcement of legal
rules-the uncertainties surrounding the content and application of formal
legal system might be alleviated. This too would encourage increased use of
formal law by Chinese citizens.
Additionally, fundamental demographic and structural changes in
Hutong communities continue as these words are written. Residents reported
that younger residents often moved out of Hutong communities when they
reached adulthood, preferring the modern amenities and greater privacy of
newer apartment buildings to the older, more crowded courtyards where they
grew up.3 3 7 Residents also reported that, as a result, their communities are
getting older in general, consisting largely of parents and grandparents whose
children have grown up and moved out.338 Young people are becoming more
mobile, educated, and affluent than their parents in China today, and this will
continue to have an adverse effect on the social cohesion of more traditional
communities, as it has in Western countries. Even Residents' Committee
mediators themselves-the most immediate and visible stewards of the old
Hutong folkways-are becoming increasingly educated and
professionalized. 339
One particularly interesting new trend is the recent influx of foreign
residents in Hutong communities. Attracted by the history and charm of the
Hutong areas themselves, a few foreigners have bought residences in
Beijing's more famous Hutong districts (especially the scenic Houhai
neighborhood), often with an eye towards refurbishing and modernizing
them.340 In fact, in one Shanghai Hutong neighborhood, a foreign resident
was recently elected to the Residents' Committee, something apparently
unprecedented in Chinese history. Insofar as such demographic shifts impact
the social fabric of Hutong communities (as they must), many of the purely
social foundations of the traditional dispute resolution system may change in
unforeseen ways.
337 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79;
Interview with Resident Group, Taiping Jie Hutong neighborhood, supra note 282;
Interview with Resident Group, Liu Li Chang Hutong neighborhood, supra note 240.
338 See supra note 337.
339 See supra Part IV (discussing the historical development of Residents'
Committees).
340 Interviews with Residents, Hou Hai Hutong neighborhood, supra note 79.
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Of course, Hutong demolition will have the most direct and potentially
catastrophic impact on traditional dispute resolution systems. This is exactly
the kind of change in "structural conditions" that Pildes claims can destroy
traditional norm-based systems. 341 Of course, one must carefully distinguish
between the physical Hutong neighborhoods themselves and the distinctive
dispute resolution regime that has developed within them. It is conceivable
that existing dispute resolution techniques may simply be transplanted to new
residential environments as urban development projects proceed.
Yet this appears a highly dubious proposition. At the very least, the
greater social and physical distance between residents in new apartment
buildings threaten to undermine the mediation and enforcement of norm-
based dispute resolutions, as the transactions costs of communicating with
neighbors, gathering information on their activities, and applying informal
reprisals against norm-violators-the fundamental components of a norm-
based dispute resolution system--will be higher.342 To invoke Ellickson's
construct of the "close-knit" group once more: Residents will have a smaller
"supply of information on past and present internal events" and reduced
"prospects for the application of power against one another."343 In this
respect, the physical design of new apartment buildings will be a key factor
in determining the transferability of Hutong ways of life-and all of the rich
social capital they create-to new residential environments. Buildings that
are physically conducive to neighborly interaction, communication, and
341 Pildes, supra note 260, at 2077.
342 One should not underestimate the fundamental changes in social dynamics that
can result from a shift to modem apartment life. The physical smallness of a Hutong
household means that Hutong residents must venture out into common courtyard areas
several times each day (in fact, most residents spend the majority of their leisure time in
shared courtyard areas), while individuals in larger multi-room apartments can stay
indoors for long stretches of time, avoiding their neighbors altogether. The physical
separation and self-sufficiency of apartment kitchens and bathroom facilities also reduces
opportunities for contact and communication. In Hutong communities, toilets are shared
by the residents of one courtyard, and cooking is often done in common areas. In
apartment buildings, residents also have a separate entranceway to their own dwelling
whereas in Hutongs one common courtyard entryway is usually shared by multiple
households, creating unavoidable contact between neighbors during the course of a
normal day. The mere presence of a heavy door that can be locked and thicker walls that
prevent household noise from being widely heard by neighbors is also critical in
differentiating the modem apartment environment. By contrast, noise travels easily
through Hutong courtyards, as attested to by the prevalence of noise disputes in Residents
Committees' mediation activities.
343 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 181.
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bonding will be much more hospitable to social capital-intensive practices. 344
If nothing else, it should -be recognized that Hutongs are rich in social
capital-just as they are undeniably poor in physical capital-and as such
their complete demolition might be a mistake if they are replaced by poorly-
designed buildings.
All of these considerations notwithstanding, it would be premature to
mourn the death of this distinctive three-tiered dispute resolution regime just
yet. For one, the system is deeply rooted in the culture of Chinese urban
life. 345 Traditions must adapt as changing times dictate, but this particular
regime has endured many transitions: from imperial rule at the turn of the
century, to fractured republican government in the pre-war decades, to
invasion and occupation by foreign armies in the 1930s and 40s, to
Communist revolution and totalitarianism, and finally to the current reform
and opening period. The dislocations of marketization may in time do what
war and political revolution could not, but this remains an open question.
Indeed, aggressive economic reform programs have fostered explosive
economic growth and fundamental societal change for more than 20 years
already, and the Hutong dispute resolution system has endured. Additionally,
the Hutongs themselves are not disappearing completely, as many of the
older Hutong neighborhoods are now being preserved as "cultural protection
zones."
346
In sum, the ultimate fate of the Hutong dispute resolution regime
examined here is far from clear. Government efforts at legal reform,
economic growth, and urban modernization all pose potential threats to its
survival, as do more general social and demographic shifts already
underway. Urban development may destroy the social capital and structural
conditions necessary for regime functioning as Hutong neighborhoods are
demolished. New legal institutions may remove some of the cost-based
incentives to use the traditional norm-based regime, though this is not likely
to have a dramatic effect in the short-term. To the extent that legal reform
efforts cultivate a greater sense of legalism and rights-consciousness in the
population, this may have deep implications for extralegal dispute resolution
regimes of all types, especially if new laws actually oppose the use of certain
traditional norms. Yet, even if realized, these possibilities imply complex
social and cultural transitions that take a long time to develop.
344 The importance of architecture in shaping the social realities of residential
communities has been wonderfully explored by Neal Katyal. Neal Katyal, Architecture
as Crime Control, Ill YALE L.J. 1039, 1041-44 (2002).
345 See supra Part II (discussing Hutong culture and historical development).
346 See Adhikari, supra note 14; Will Beijing's Hutongs Vanish?, supra note 14.
906
[Vol. 20:3 2005]
BEIJING HUTONGS
Yet these trends cut both ways. Hutong dispute resolution methods are
time-tested, rooted in hundreds of years of cultural tradition and accumulated
social practice. More importantly, they seem to be effective in maintaining
social order within Hutong neighborhoods, and by definition, they seem to
embody the methods most normatively acceptable to members of these
communities. As such, legal reformers ignore Hutong norms at their peril. At
the least, laws ill-fitted to existing norms can preclude the functioning of
efficient norm-based dispute resolution regimes and destroy social capital in
the process. At the worst, such laws could actually discredit the legal system
more generally, galvanize popular support for countervailing norms, and
deepen social tendencies toward extralegality.
Conversely, new laws that dovetail with existing social norms will likely
benefit from increased normative legitimacy among the populace and fewer
problems surrounding their practical application. Ideally, new laws and legal
institutions could harness efficient norm-based systems and incorporate both
their substantive content and their institutional apparatus into new legal
institutions. Legal reformers seeking to establish a "rule of law" 347 in China
will confront this coincidence of opportunity and peril in all areas of Chinese
law where preexisting norm-based regimes exist (i.e., almost everywhere).
The Hutong regime discussed here provides but one particularly colorful and
informative example.
IX. SUMMARY
This Article corroborates much of the prior scholarship that emphasizes
the important role of extralegal norms in guiding dispute resolution among
members of distinct communities. Like the "close-knit" groups examined in
other studies, Hutong residents appear fundamentally predisposed to resolve
inter-neighbor disputes extra-legally through recourse to dispute resolution
mechanisms based entirely in informal community social norms. Hutong
residents regard formal legal institutions as too costly in terms of time,
money, and social capital, and too unpredictable and opaque to be an
efficient means of dispute resolution in most cases. Recourse to formal law is
reserved for instances where the monetary value of the amounts in dispute far
exceed the costs of going to court, and where existing social relationships-
and hence the prospect of expected future interactions between disputants-
347 This incredibly broad and politically loaded term admits many definitions and
interpretations. Most any of the conventional ones will suffice for the purposes of our
discussion here.
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are either extinguished or de-valued (i.e., where disputants are at "end
game").
While this project confirms some of the basic conclusions of prior
studies, it also raises a few new issues related to dispute resolution within the
context of a developing or transitional legal system, hints at institutional
possibilities largely ignored in prior studies, and challenges some of the
implicit or explicit assumptions that have guided prior treatments of norm-
based dispute resolution systems.
The opacity and uncertainty-as opposed to mere economic cost-
associated with formal legal institutions is something not emphasized in the
prior literature on the subject, and indeed may be most relevant to dispute
resolution regimes in nascent or institutionally deficient legal systems. As
such, it may be an important factor in shaping dispute resolution regimes in
developing countries generally. Additionally, while residents' preferences for
extra-legal, norm-based solutions to disputes appear universal, our research
hints at the variety of institutional channels through which they might pursue
such solutions. Hutong residents actually use a three-tiered, scalable dispute
resolution regime that allows them to choose from among a range of dispute
resolution mechanisms, each implying a different level of legalism, cost,
flexibility, social disruption, and access to state power. Residents can choose
the systemic tier whose institutions best suit the exigencies of their particular
dispute, and they can switch between tiers and "re-scale" as their needs
dictate.
The first tier is the private, neighbor-to-neighbor bargaining, which
combines the highest degree of flexibility with the lowest levels of cost,
legalism, and access to state power. This is the kind of private bargaining
envisioned by Ronald Coase and emphasized by most of the literature on
norm-based dispute resolution regimes. The third tier is comprised of formal
legal dispute resolution mechanisms, which encompass the official legal
system and all of its institutional trappings. This third tier implies the highest
economic costs, the least flexibility, and the greatest social disruption, but it
provides the greatest access to the coercive powers of the state.
The second tier is the most analytically interesting, made up of "non-
legalistic public authorities" such as the Residents' Committee and the
Neighborhood Police. These institutional actors are specialized mediation
"experts" sanctioned and compensated by the government, yet they lack
coercive powers and are distinctly extra-legal local in both the sources and
application of their authority. They are elected by the community, they apply
community norms rather than formal legal rules to the disputes brought
before them, and they rely on informal social sanctions and direct physical
reprisals by other community members for the enforcement of their mediated
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resolutions. In this way, Hutong residents benefit from the speed, cost-
effectiveness, and flexibility of more "pure" norm-based private negotiations
while benefiting from the intervention of mediation "experts" who can
provide added predictability and public legitimacy to dispute resolutions,
alleviate problems of bilateral monopoly in intra-neighbor negotiations, and
ensure that disputes are contained and resolved in socially constructive ways.
Unlike professional ADR mediators summoned to handle a single
specific dispute or arbitration, Residents' Committee mediators are repeat
players with so-called general jurisdiction, able to create a richer, more
consistent, and more comprehensive norm-based regime, complete with
predetermined principles, exceptions, and unofficial common-law-style
precedents for various dispute types. Expert-mediated resolutions are in turn
enforced by individual members of the community, who impose economic
and social costs on intransigent neighbors. Here, residents are not just
minimizing traditionally understood transaction costs, but are also
maximizing social status and social capital and seeking the esteem of their
neighbors, even if it proves to be an entirely non-pecuniary benefit. This
dynamic does not merely implicate the reputation-as-economic-asset concept
so prevalent in the literature concerning the role of norms in business
communities; it includes situations where social status may be sought for its
own sake, even at the expense of economic efficiency. Residents also exhibit
an internalized sense of duty to uphold community norms, rooted in both the
intimate social nature of Hutong life and fundamental notions of social duty
and reciprocity.
Thus, Hutong residents can be seen as "bargaining in the shadow of the
community" in the most comprehensive sense. Shared community norms
provide the preferred basis for dispute resolution, and they animate the
activities of the non-legalistic public authorities charged with mediating
disputes and maintaining community harmony. Private informal sanctioning
by members of the community also provide the primary means of enforcing
norm-based resolutions, along with deep notions of social status and
communal obligations. While the norms that structure community life are
private and extra-legal in a very real sense, our research indicates that semi-
legalistic, public institutions can have an important role to play in their
maintenance and productive application.
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